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This paper empirically examines how changes in the hierarchical structure of a large organization can
aﬀect incentives. The empirical analysis exploits a change in the hierarchical structure of the Corporate
Division of a private foreign commercial bank in Argentina between 1999 and 2001. Using detailed hand
collected data on credit approvals, as well as perceived eﬀort measures for each relationship manager from
quality surveys done to borrowing ﬁrms, I test whether delegation of authority and reduction of oversight
improves or decreases the provision of eﬀort by account managers. Results suggest that “empowering
managers” increases the time relationship managers spend with their corporate clients, increases perceived
eﬀort and reduces the number of complaints the bank receives from its clients. Alternative explanations
and several tests are constructed to examine the diﬀerent channels through which eﬀort measures could
have increased other than the change in organizational structure. I then test whether the improvement
is really because managers make better use of their decision making authority rather than they simply
w a s t el e s st i m ei nﬁling reports to their superiors. I ﬁnd that individuals who receive more authority use
their soft information more compared to individuals to whom authority is only partially delegated. This
suggests that delegation of authority increases managerial eﬀort not only because management spends
less time reporting to bosses, but also because they recognize that their eﬀort will have greater impact on
outcomes. Hence, transmission of, and reliance on, soft information are higher under decentralized than
centralized structures. Finally, I test whether the change in structure was meaningful and productive from
the bank’s ﬁnancial perspective. I ﬁnd that cross-selling measures and bank’s ﬁnancial ratios increased
after the organizational change.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In 1962 Alfred D.Chandler, in his pioneer work “Strategy and Structure”, shed anecdotal light
on the importance of internal hierarchical structures in organizations. Using evidence from the
executives at Du Pont, General Motors, Standard Oil Company and Sears, Roebuck & Company,
he described the importance of creating autonomous divisions and changing the organizational
layout towards a more decentralized control structure by delegating power and independence to the
lower layers of the hierarchy. In the chapter of his book on General Motors, Chandler refers to
Alfred Sloan’s restructuring plan for GM as:
“In the analysis of General Motor’s organizational needs, Sloan’s plan began with
the assumption that the operating divisions must retain their autonomy. A centralized
structure was out of the question. Even the milder type of supervision had met great re-
sistance.[...]...Moreover, the plan ﬁrmly believed that divisional independence encouraged
initiative and innovation.”1
Aghion and Tirole [1997] develop a theoretical framework to formalize the evidence discussed by
Chandler. By distinguishing between real and formal authority in organizations, they conclude that
delegating formal authority to the lower layers of a hierarchy can promote initiative, thus enabling
employees to exert higher eﬀort.2 Despite its plausibility, this rationale for delegation of control
has never, to the best of my knowledge, been tested empirically, as it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd a suitable
setting and the corresponding data to do so. Of course, an alternative view is that supervision
plays an essential role in preventing slacking. In this more traditional principal agent framework
the delegation of authority and the reduction of supervision, if not accompanied by a change in the
formal incentive system, could lead managers to slack-oﬀ. This paper attempts to determine which
view is more consistent with the data.
I use evidence from a change in hierarchical structure inside a large organization in order
to test these opposing views: delegation of authority or decentralized control against classical
monitoring theory or centralized control. Evidence from this hierarchical change is relevant to
the debate concerning whether ﬂat organizations are better or worse than steep ones, in terms of
the work performance of the employees and the way provision of incentives is handled within the
1From Strategy and Structure. Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enterprise, Cambridge Massachusetts,
MIT Press1962, page 133.
2Aghion and Tirole [1997] named this eﬀect the “Incentive View of Delegation”.
2organization.3 Although the change under consideration in this paper occurs within the structure
of a large organization, the experiment is also useful to understand some of the reasons for spin-oﬀs
and stand-alone companies in large conglomerates.4
The change in hierarchical structure that I study takes place in the Corporate Commercial
Division of a private foreign bank in Argentina. Corporate relationships between ﬁrms and the bank
are developed in this Division. Account oﬃcers, also called relationship managers, henceforth RMs,
are appointed to handle such ﬁrm-bank relationships. The hierarchical change consisted of giving
to some relationship managers either partial or complete decision making authority by reducing
the supervision and monitoring by their superiors. I test whether the delegation of authority and
reduction of oversight improves or decreases the provision of eﬀort by RMs. I ﬁnd that reduction
in supervision does seem to enhance the provision of eﬀort by RMs.
Approvals of credit decisions are not solely based on quantitative variables (hard information)
but also on qualitative measures (soft information). Both the incentives for gathering soft infor-
mation and the relative use of each type of information may vary with the degree of authority
delegated to the account oﬃcer who handles an account.
To test whether the improvement in eﬀort measures is really because account oﬃcers make
better use of their decision making authority, rather than simply wasting less time reporting to their
superiors, I check whether account oﬃc e r sw h or e c e i v em o r ea u t h o r i t yu s em o r es o f ti n f o r m a t i o n
than individuals to whom authority is only partially delegated (Stein [2002]). I ﬁnd this is the case.
RMs who are delegated full authority embed qualitative information about the ﬁrm in their pricing
decisions as opposed to those account oﬃcers who have only partial authority.
Given the nature of this setting, and the lack of empirical evidence on the use of soft information
in credit allocation and pricing decisions, the paper attempts to combine the role of delegation and
its eﬀects on eﬀort exertion with the impact that delegating authority triggers on the ﬁrm-bank
relationship, as well as, on the use of qualitative information.
Let me now describe my results in greater detail.
The organizational structure change took place in September of 2000. I use data from the years
1999 and 2001 at the relationship manager level as well as detailed hand collected data from credit
folders of the ﬁrms borrowing from this bank. Speciﬁcally, I attempt to answer the following four
questions.
3There is a vast theoretical literature that addresses the provision of incentives within an organization. Among
others, see Alchian and Demsetz [1972], Williamson [1985], Holmstrom and Roberts [1998] and Rajan and Zingales
[2001].
4See among others, Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts [1992], Rajan and Zingales [2000], Scharfstein and Stein [2000]
and Wulf [2001] on this last point.
3First, does the increase in responsibility and delegation of authority increase the initiative and
eﬀort exerted by relationship managers in handling their relationships with the ﬁrms? Ie x a m i n e
the impact of the hierarchical structure change on incentives and on perceived eﬀort measures
of relationship managers. To identify such eﬀects, I use as control group a group of relationship
managers who did not experience any change in either their tasks or their supervisory structure.
I analyze this question both at the individual relationship manager level and at the ﬁrm level,
using diﬀerent measures of RM eﬀort based on quality ratings from each borrowing ﬁrm that the
RM handles. To the best of my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst attempt to test a theory of delegation
of authority along the lines of Aghion and Tirole [1997]. Results suggest that delegation had a
positive impact on RMs eﬀort, as perceived by the borrowing ﬁrms, increased the time RMs spent
with their corporate clients and reduced the number of complaints received by the bank from its
clients. These results hold both at the aggregate relationship manager level, as well as at the ﬁrm
level. Results are robust to alternative explanations including for ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics and
selection issues.
Second, is sorting of ﬁrms across relationship managers driving the results? I address alternative
explanations other than delegation, which could account for the increase in perceived eﬀort. It is
still empirically unclear from the relationship lending literature which are the factors that determine
allocation of eﬀort in terms of monitoring large corporate ﬁrms. Controlling for confounding stories
which might have a diﬀerential impact on eﬀort does not change the result found for the impact
of delegation of authority. Perceived eﬀort from RMs who experienced full delegation of authority
increased independently of these other channels. Even though more leveraged and proﬁtable ﬁrms,
as well as speciﬁc internal credit criteria to the bank, as adverse changes in collateral and increase
in credit facilities, have a diﬀerential impact on eﬀort, the direct eﬀect of delegating authority due
to the organizational change does not vanish. Thus, sorting of ﬁrms among relationship managers
according to these internal bank criteria and speciﬁc characteristics are not driving the results
on eﬀort. These ﬁndings also shed light on the mechanisms through which monitoring activities
inﬂuence ﬁrm behavior in large corporate-business lending.
Third, i st h ei n c r e a s eo fe ﬀort simply a consequence of the reduction in bureaucracy or because
managers recognize their eﬀort has a higher impact on outcomes? It is clear that the reduction
in bureaucracy implied that RMs had more time to spend with their clients. But did it impact
the quality of their work in ways consistent with greater delegation? To answer this question, I
check whether authority aﬀects the use of soft versus hard information when pricing working capital
loans. Given the diﬀerences in transmission costs between soft and hard information among cen-
tralized (partial delegation) and decentralized (full delegation) structures, I would expect increased
4authority to lead to a higher use of soft relative to hard information consistent with the model of
Stein [2002]. I perform a test for Stein’s theoretical implications on the link between organizational
structure and the role of qualitative information. My results suggest that when managers acquired
complete independence of responsibilities, they based their decisions more heavily on qualitative
relative to quantitative information as compared to RMs who experienced only partial delegation of
authority and were still under a centralized structure. Oﬃcers who received only partial authority
must credibly convince their superiors of the accuracy of the information they gather, and hard
information is easier to transmit than soft information.
Finally, is the change in structure meaningful and productive? Does decentralization of control
improve the bank’s knowledge of their clients in terms of ﬁnancial and banking services needs? It
is not clear whether the fact that RMs spend more time with their clients implies that the bank
becomes closer to the ﬁrm making the ﬁrm-bank relationship more productive. Since I focus mainly
on eﬀort measures, it could be the case that the additional time RMs spend with their clients has
no impact on the proﬁtability of the bank.5 Using the cross-selling ratio as a measure of closeness
to the ﬁrm, I examine the impact of delegating authority on the bank’s ﬁnancial performance. I
ﬁnd that due to the additional time devoted to improving knowledge of clients’ ﬁnancial needs,
cross-selling increased between 14% and 16% after the organizational change. The change also had
a positive impact on both the proﬁtability of the bank and on risk-adjusted earnings. Hence, I
show that the organizational had a productive and sizeable economic impact on the bank.
Selection issues are particularly important in the analysis. To the extent that authority was
not delegated to a random set of relationship managers and that ﬁrms are not randomly assigned
to relationship managers, the matching process that determines such assignments may ultimately
be driving the results. I speciﬁcally address selection problems and ﬁnd that the observed impact
on eﬀort after the change in hierarchical structure does not merely reﬂect selection issues.
The paper contributes both to the incentives and relationship lending banking literature in three
ways. Firstly, I test and ﬁnd evidence consistent with Aghion and Tirole’s theory of delegation
and initiative. Secondly, delegating authority increases managerial eﬀort not only by reducing
bureaucracy but because RMs recognize their eﬀort will have a greater impact on outcomes. Using
Stein [2002], I test the use of soft relative to hard information, in credit pricing decisions by those
individuals with full, rather than partial, responsibility. Finally, delegation of authority has a real
5Allocation of time is mostly left to the relationship manager’s will after the change in structure takes place.
Perceived eﬀort measures may increase either through productive work or through playing golf, enjoying extended
lunch hours with the ﬁrms’ executives or other related activities. Thus, additional time spent could be unproductive
from the bank’s perspective.
5eﬀect on the banks’ large-business lending practices, as evidenced by cross-selling opportunities and
a positive impact on the ﬁnancial performance of the bank.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of the theory, Sec-
tion 3 describes the institutional set up, the hierarchical structure change within the organization
and the data used in this paper. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy and presents tests
for decentralization versus centralization of authority both at the RM and ﬁrm level. Section 5
addresses confounding stories through which perceived eﬀort measures could have increased other
than the change in the hierarchical structure providing some evidence on ex-post monitoring activ-
ities. Section 6 presents the results on delegation of authority and the usage of soft relative to hard
information. Section 7 analyzes the real impact of the change in structure in terms of closeness
of the ﬁrm-bank relationship and proﬁtability measures. Section 8 is left for concluding remarks.
Appendix A describes the data set used throughout the analysis with the deﬁnition and a detailed
description of each variable.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Decentralized versus Centralized Control
The role of monitoring under asymmetric information in traditional agency problems is well under-
stood in the literature.6 In the context of this paper, the key implication of this set of theories is
that individuals who are monitored better exert more eﬀort than their peers ceteris paribus.
In contrast to classical monitoring theory, recent papers suggest monitoring may diminish the
incentive to exert eﬀort. The literature on organizational structure has added new insights to the
understanding of the role of monitoring. Introducing concepts such as delegation and initiative
inside organizations (Aghion and Tirole [1997]), how bureaucracy aﬀects generation of information
within the organization (Zingales and Novaes [1998]) and how the decentralization of decisions
impact allocation of funds and research (Stein [2002]) has all impacted the way classical agency
problems are studied.
For the case at hand, the incentive view is the key to understanding the impact of delegating
decisions. The delegation of responsibility to the lower hierarchical layers of the bank is motivated
by initiative considerations regarding the responsibility of the account, the acquisition and trans-
mission of information to upper layers of the hierarchy and the competition among relationship
6For a review of the literature on classical monitoring agency problems see the work of Holmstrom [1979] and
Holmstrom and Milgrom [1991], among others.
6managers of the attention of the superiors in their accounts.7
Aghion and Tirole [1997] has been one of the most signiﬁcant contributions to the organizational
design literature. They conclude that when agents care about outcomes, and not only about the
eﬀort they exert, increasing the agent’s formal authority (“right to decide”), as opposed to real
authority (“eﬀective control of decisions”), promotes initiative, inducing the agent to exert higher
eﬀort than would have otherwise occurred.
This theory suggests a new set of empirical predictions. However, the lack of a suitable set-
ting and diﬃculties in gathering the necessary data has prevented an execution of a test for such
predictions.
2.2 Organizational Structure and Soft Information
In order to determine if the increase in eﬀort measures is due to a reduction of bureaucracy or
because account oﬃcers recognize their eﬀo r tw i l lh a v ea ni m p a c to no u t c o m e s ,t h es e c o n dp a r to f
the paper examines the impact of the change in authority on the nature of decision-making and on
the closeness of the ﬁrm-bank relationship.
Hard information is information that can be costlessly and instantaneously veriﬁed. For the
purposes of this paper hard information is cheap to verify. Conversely, soft information cannot be
veriﬁed by the other party except at a high cost. Nevertheless, a diﬀerence should be made in the
meaning of the term soft information between small and large business lending ﬁrms.8 For small
business lending, soft information refers to speciﬁc knowledge of the quality of management, quality
of the ﬁrm, its competitive position and the daily business it is involved in. By contrast, corporate
clients have their business well established in the market. Soft information in large business lending
refers more to the closeness of the relationship between the ﬁrm and the bank and to the degree
of commitment between both parties.9 In the context of large business lending, the eﬀort the RM
exerts shows how close the bank is to the ﬁrm and how much commitment exists between both
parties.
The empirical literature has not yet been entirely successful in clearly disentangling the use of
7This last point is similar to Stein [2002]. In his paper, agents compete for a larger share of funds, whereas in the
case of the relationship managers they may compete for a larger share of eﬀort from their superior to be allocated
on their own assignments. Instead of facing an internal capital market problem, relationship managers engage in an
internal competition for the attention and eﬀort of their superiors.
8It is not in the scope of the paper to theoretically deﬁne and describe the diﬀerences of soft information among
small and large business lending. Very little is known in the literature regarding the use of soft information in small
and large business lending. Petersen [2002] establishes a theoretical diﬀerence between soft and hard information
discussing the advantages and disadvantages of one over the other in ﬁnancial transactions.
9See Uzzi [1999] and [2002] for the importance of social relations and networks in business lending.
7soft relative to hard information in relationship lending practices. Berger et al [2002] attempt to
understand the role of soft information between small and large organizations by testing Stein’s
[2002] theory and conclude that small organizations are more eﬃcient in collecting and utilizing
soft information relative to large organizations. Using a more direct approach, I construct a test
for Stein’s theory using the diﬀerences in the degree of authority delegated to RMs.
Large business lending takes place in a multi-product environment involving both lending prod-
ucts and transactional banking services.10 T h ef a c tt h a ts o m eR M sw e r eg i v e nm o r ea u t h o r i t yi s
explored in order to determine its implications regarding the use of qualitative information and the
cross-selling activities. The change had a direct impact on the cross-sell of ﬁr m sa sr e l a t i o n s h i p
managers had more freedom to allocate their time and eﬀort among their clients deepening the
knowledge about their clients needs.
3 Institutional Setup and Hierarchical Change
3.1 The Corporate Bank Division
The private foreign bank referred to throughout the paper is a top tier bank in Argentina in terms
of total assets and net worth, and is ranked as one of the best commercial banks in the world.11
The Corporate Bank Division is the heart of the business of any commercial bank. It provides
short, medium and long term ﬁnancing, as well as non-lending products and transactional banking
services to large corporations. It is the division where the relationship between the ﬁrm and the
bank is established, developed and consolidated throughout the years by the account oﬃcers.12
The changes I study took place in this division.
The bank appoints Relationship Managers who are in charge of developing the ﬁrm-bank rela-
tionship, understanding the requirements of the clients and having a deep knowledge of the ﬁrm’s
ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial needs in order to provide the right product at the right time. They
may even propose and create new products for the client. They represent the bank to the ﬁrm and
any inquiry of the ﬁrm regarding any product goes through them. Although they may not have
speciﬁc knowledge concerning all products and services oﬀered by the bank, they do have general
knowledge of products and are supposed to refer the client to the appropriate product specialist.
10This is in contrast to small business lending practices where lending activities are the main product.
11I have signed a non-disclosure agreement with the bank and therefore I cannot mention in any written document
the name of the institution where the data I use comes from.
12Ad i ﬀerence should be noted regarding the meaning of the term relationship in this setting as compared to small
business lending. In that case, the bank’s main role is provision of liquidity with little, if any, use of the broad variety
of lending and non-lending products oﬀered to corporate clients. The role of relationship managers in small business
lending is concentrated on scanning prospective clients and handling internal rules to monitor ﬁrms.
8Essentially, relationship managers are ﬁnancial advisors to the ﬁrms. Each Relationship Manager
services a number of ﬁrms.
Firms are screened before they become a Corporate Client and can deal with the bank. Apart
from speciﬁc constraints on the industries the ﬁrm belongs to, the general requirement that all
ﬁrms must satisfy is that the total annual net sales should be above 50 million pesos.13
3.2 Hierarchical Structure Change and Redeﬁnition of Roles
Relationship Managers focus on day-to-day credit decisions and credit maintenance of existing
facilities approved on annual basis for each of the ﬁrms they handle in their portfolio.14 RMs are
divided in teams. Each team is called a Business Unit, henceforth BU, and deals with a particular
group of industries. Each RM is assigned to one Business Unit. Sizes of BUs vary. BUs consist of one
Division Manager or Unit Head, henceforth UH, who is in charge of monitoring, coordinating and
helping the RM in the process of approving the credit facilities she recommended and any special
transaction through the levels of the approval hierarchy inside the bank.15 T h eU n i tH e a de x e r t s
eﬀort in convincing the upper layers of the hierarchy in approving the credit facilities proposed.
The RM also reports to the Unit Head any advances and changes in the bank-ﬁrm relationship such
as potential new deals, new non-lending products that could be sold and any other information she
considers relevant to the relationship and that the UH should be acquainted of.
Although the RM is in charge of the relationship and directs all communications between the
bank and the ﬁrm, inside the bank the oﬃcer responsible for the credit approvals is the Unit Head.
If there is any problem in the process of approval, any concern about the quality of the loan, or
in the method of approval, the upper layers of the bank will contact the Unit Head and not the
Relationship Manager. All credit facilities have to be reviewed at least once a year, so as to reassess
risk. This involves an updated analysis and a review of the performance and other interactions with
the client. Relationships with ongoing, short-term obligations have to be reviewed with at least
the same depth as they were in the original credit approval, including ﬁnancial, management and
other qualitative analysis.
The UHs ensure the proper coordination, execution and monitoring of each credit transaction
from early consulting and discussion through approval and maturity. They coordinate the approval
13In the period under analysis 1999-2001, under Convertibility Law 25,445, 1 Argentine Peso was equivalent to 1
US Dollar.
14Once a credit transaction has been approved, RMs monitor the risk exposure and maintain it at an acceptable
level. Normal risk management maintenance activities include among other things: controlling documentation and
disbursement, monitoring timely repayment, controlling and valuing collateral and reviewing the status of an exposure.
15Approval levels depend on total amount of credit facilities to be approved, the maximum tenor of those facilities,
the amount of total credit approvals collateralized and the internal risk rating of the company.
9process inside the bank, through ensuring that the documentation is complete, monitoring informa-
tion ﬂow and avoiding excessive approval signatures by deciding who must sign and who must be
kept informed. They also determine at what point early consultation on credit policy issues should
be brought to the attention of senior risk managers, or on any other issue that might jeopardize
the approval of the credit facility involved.
R M sa n dU H se x e r te ﬀort in a complementary way to develop the ﬁrm-bank relationship. In
each unit, the UH coordinates and exerts eﬀort in each project, jointly with an RM. While the UH
handles all projects in the business unit and has knowledge of all clients, each RM handles only a
subset of ﬁrms in the unit. Since size of Business Units vary, each unit has a diﬀerent number of
RMs working under the supervision of the UH.
Two changes took place around mid September of 2000. The ﬁrst one was the Introduction
of Senior Bankers (Full Delegation of Authority Case) and the second one was the change of
organizational structure within teams and a redeﬁnition of roles (Partial Delegation of Authority
Case). Henceforth, the original setting is referred to as Initial Regime (1999) and the modiﬁed
one as Changed Regime (2001). The description of the changes and its diagrams are presented as
follows.
1. Introduction of Senior Bankers. Role of Authority and Decentralization of Control.
A subset of the RMs acquired full responsibility for the accounts they handled after the change.
They were named Senior Bankers, henceforth SB. Full delegation of responsibilities was given to SBs
in terms of acquisition of information from the ﬁrms, selling of lending and non-lending products and
total responsibility in terms of coordinating and monitoring loan approvals. These Senior Bankers
were individuals who used to be relationship managers in 1999 and had to report to a UH. After
the change, they also became fully responsible for the accounts they handled inside the bank, and
no longer needed to report to a UH. Compared to the Initial structure, these individuals became
less monitored and gained freedom over their allocation of time across the ﬁrms they manage.
They reported directly to the Commercial Bank Head. It is important to emphasize that their
compensation scheme was not aﬀected by the change in roles. That is, the introduction of Senior
Bankers was not accompanied by any change in their payment schedule.
The theoretical predictions for the consequences of this change case are clear from the literature.
If delegation of authority, or decentralization of control, increase incentives, Senior Bankers should
exert more eﬀort. I use as a control group managers in teams that did not change their hierarchical
structure or managerial responsibilities.
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2. Initial to Changed Regime. Partial Delegation of Responsibilities to Relationship
Managers.
In the Initial regime teams were composed of 1 or 2 RMs reporting to the UH, except for
one business unit that had 5 RMs reporting to the UH. This BU will be used as a control group
throughout the analysis. After the hierarchical change, in the Changed regime, all BUs except for
the control group were transformed into teams of 3 individuals, i.e. all business units were formed
by 2 RMs and one UH. Besides the team size eﬀect in Changed regime there was an additional
change. Besides coordinating and monitoring accounts in the unit, UHs now also had to handle
their own portfolio of accounts.
The theoretical predictions for this switching of regimes are also clear. Here, I divide the eﬀects
11for those RMs who reported directly to a UH in a 1-1 relationship, henceforth 1-1 Relationship,
versus those in a 1-2 Relationship.
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a.) T h eR o l eo fI n i t i a t i v e .In the Changed regime, if classical agency view holds then, on average,
RMs in 2001 should exert less eﬀort than RMs in 1999 do. Two eﬀects conditioned the eﬀort
for those RMs that were in a 1-1 relationship in 1999 and were moved to a 1-2 relationship
in 2001. First, the team size eﬀect, as the UH -still the responsible oﬃcer of the account-
monitored more RMs at the same time. Second, the time allocation eﬀect,s i n c eU H si nt h e
Changed regime were give the added duty of managing accounts on their own. If classic agency
view holds then perceived eﬀort measures would have decreased since both eﬀects move in
the same direction of lower monitoring levels. However, these changes simultaneously implied
12that UHs’ degree of involvement in each account the RM handled was reduced. Under the
Changed regime, there is less room for overruling and overlapping of activities between RMs
and UHs, due to the lower involvement of the UH and a higher role for initiative from the
RM in handling the account. The incentive view of delegation predicts that perceived eﬀort
measures should have increased, regardless of whether the RM was in a 1-1 or 1-2 hierarchical
relationship in 1999. The diﬀerence between the type of relationships in 1999 stems only from
the fact that RMs in a 1-1 relationship are subject to both eﬀects after the change while those
in a 1-2 relationship are subject to only the time eﬀect.
b.) Diﬀerential Impact on Eﬀort. If the role of initiative prevails, on average RMs in 2001 should
e x e r tm o r ee ﬀort than RMs in 1999 do, but there are no clear predictions whether higher
eﬀort is expected from those RMs originally in 1-1 or 1-2 relationships.
c.) Relative Performance Evaluation/Tournaments. T h ei n c r e a s ei ne ﬀort can also be a con-
sequence of competition among relationship managers rather than by an incentive view of
delegation.16 Managers compete among themselves for the attention and eﬀort of their supe-
rior in the activities they engage. In the empirical section, I disentangle whether the increase
in eﬀort is due to a relative performance evaluation theory or to an incentive view of delega-
tion.
Although it was clear that the change was performed in order to increase the time an RM devotes
in understanding the ﬁnancial needs of the company, thereby enhancing their role as ﬁnancial
advisors, changing RMs may sometimes be optimal from the bank’s perspective. A very strong
relationship between an RM and the ﬁrm may lead to high dependence on only one individual
for information from a certain client, which may not be ideal from the bank’s perspective. As
less bureaucracy means less hard evidence knowledge of a ﬁrm remains embedded in the account
oﬃcer. Although a strong and deep relationship with clients is desired, there may be a beneﬁcial
role associated with introducing some level of “bureaucracy”, or forcing people to move across
sectors to avoid reliance on a single person. Such concentration of information on one individual
creates a dependence that may backﬁre in the future (Zingales and Novaes [1998]). This is one
of the reasons why considerable turnover and switching of relationship managers in handling the
accounts is observed.
To understand the scope and magnitude of the change within the organization, the following
qualitative evidence should be pointed out about the changes. First, I informally asked several
16On relative performance evaluation and tournaments see the work of Lazear and Rosen [1981] and Rosen [1986].
13Relationship Managers in diﬀerent Business Units if they personally felt that there was a change
in terms of their daily work-load and their working interactions with the UHs. This was indeed
the case. RMs believed that the degree of involvement of their superiors in their accounts was
substantially reduced and they had more ﬂexibility and freedom to contact their clients, with no
need to be constantly reporting their actions to their UHs. RMs felt overruling and overlapping of
activities was signiﬁcantly reduced. Second, Senior Bankers were given bigger oﬃces, comparable
to the ones UHs had, and internal credit manuals were speciﬁcally altered to reﬂect the role that
SBs acquired in becoming the oﬃcers responsible of the accounts.
3.3 Data
I personally conducted the ﬁeld work during the months of July and December of 2001 inside
the bank. The Data Appendix provides the deﬁnition and a detailed description of each of the
variables used in the empirical section of the paper. The data collection itself can be divided into
three diﬀerent groups:
( i )a tt h erelationship manager level, I handed questionnaires to the Relationship Managers and Se-
nior Bankers to obtain personal characteristics, and I also gathered information on the composition
of the portfolio of credit facilities that each RM handled from the Credit Administration Division;
(ii) at the ﬁrm level, I manually collected information from credit folders for each ﬁrm under
analysis and obtained detailed revenue data including commissions and fees for both lending and
non-lending products for each ﬁrm;
(iii) as eﬀort measures I used annual surveys carried by the Quality Team Division about the ﬁrm-
bank relationship, and I also counted letters of complaints received by the bank from the Customer
Service Division.
For the RM level data analysis, personal observable characteristics of each relationship manager
and/or senior banker were gathered through a set of questions I handed to each account oﬃcer.
Questions included age, years of experience in the bank, years of experience in the Corporate Bank
and whether the compensation scheme changed as a consequence of the hierarchical change. The
Credit Administration Division of the bank allowed me access to the total portfolio and number of
accounts of each relationship manager, the quality composition of their portfolio, use of cross-border
funding and the share of local approval of the portfolio.
For the ﬁrm level data analysis, I collected information from the credit folders and facilities
credit approvals of each of the companies under analysis for the last 3 years. For this project, I
gathered hard and soft information for both years of 1999 and 2001, for those ﬁrms that appeared
14in the survey in any of the two years.17 Large ﬁrms, depending on their size and ﬁnancial position,
may have access to local or international capital markets. All these ﬁr m sh a v et os o m ee x t e n t
access to capital markets or other sources of ﬁnding. Hence, ﬁrms from the sample may be listed
or non-listed in some stock exchange but they are all considered “corporate clients” of the bank.
Apart from ﬁnancial statement data which is publicly available for listed ﬁrms, all the individual
ﬁrm data, both ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial, that I manually collected is not public.
The qualitative evidence regarding the speciﬁc roles of the Relationship Managers, Senior
Bankers and Unit Heads, and on the organizational aspects of the structure were collected from
internal credit manuals, management policy manuals, internal documentation and banking records
referring to the organizational structure of the Corporate Bank for the years 1999 and 2001.
Perhaps the most important piece of information are the eﬀort measures. Perceived eﬀort
measures from the ﬁrms were taken from annual quality surveys done by an independent consulting
company hired by the bank in order to assess the satisfaction status of the ﬁrm-bank relationship.
These surveys were done in a consistent way in both years18 on a random set of corporate clients
from the commercial bank, with and without credit exposure with the bank. The purpose of the
survey is to learn about the ﬁr m - b a n kr e l a t i o n s h i pw i t hs p e c i ﬁc emphasis on the role of RMs in
particular aspects of the relationship. I used the surveys for years 1999 and 2001 with a total of 203
and 180 surveyed ﬁrms respectively. Firms evaluate the RMs’ performance by ranking their behavior
on a 1-7 scale for each speciﬁc question that is asked, including the overall average performance
of the RM in the relationship, the time devoted to the account and the ability to communicate
with them, knowledge and experience of the RM in providing solutions and the speed of the RM’s
response to clients’ requests, among others. Surveys include both individual RM questions about
handling the account and more general ﬁrm-bank relationship questions. Only the questions that
are particularly aimed at assessing the RM’s performance were used in the analysis.
One issue of concern refers to who answers the survey’s questions. I checked in the ﬁles of the
surveys, since the name, rank and position of the person in the ﬁrm who answered the questions
is recorded and I feel comfortable that the answers reﬂect a valid and meaningful evaluation of the
17Although by deﬁnition soft information is hard to write down, I use the word soft for that information that is
initially not available in hard numbers and is not easily reducible to a numerical score (Petersen [2002]). That is, it
takes time and resources from the relationship managers to learn if the management of a company has for example
the ability to act decisively under pressure or the honesty and character of the senior management. Thus, in the large
organization under consideration, soft information is stored and processed assigning numerical values to diﬀerent
ﬁelds. Whether this process of hardening soft information implies losing information or not is beyond the scope of
the paper.
18The only diﬀerence between 1999 and 2001 surveys is the inclusion of two additional questions in 2001. Such
questions refer to the frequency of visits that the RM does to the ﬁrm annually and the time devoted to answering
the ﬁrm’s phone calls and messages.
15ﬁrm-bank relationship.19 When possible, I matched the ﬁr m ss u r v e y e di nb o t hy e a r sw i t ht h eh a r d
and soft information I collected from the credit folders approvals.
To the extent that these are perceived eﬀort measures from the ﬁrms’ point of view, they may
not imply a real expression of the true eﬀort relationship managers exert.20 To ensure robustness of
the results, an alternative and independent procedure was also followed. Instead of perceived eﬀort
measures, I used the number of letters of complaints received by the bank regarding the role of the
RM. The Customer Service Division receives all enquiries regarding the ﬁrm-bank relationship and
collects all sorts of comments and letters from the customers. I counted the letters of complaints
and bad comments that were collected by the Customer Service Division of the bank for both years
1999 and 2001. All letters received in the relevant period were used in the analysis, regardless if
the ﬁrm who sent such letter was one of the ﬁrms that participated in the quality survey or not.
Finally, some limitations of the data collected should be pointed out. First, at the RM level one
account oﬃcer was ﬁred prior to the change and some others were transferred to another Division
outside the Corporate Bank after the change. On the other hand, also after the change two new
RMs joined the Corporate Bank. I followed the procedure of taking out of the sample the RM who
was ﬁred and the new ones added after the change since they did not belong to the experiment under
analysis.21 Second, at the ﬁrm level data diﬀerent issues are raised. Although ﬁrms do not disappear
across years, as the mean length of relationship of surveyed ﬁr m si s8 . 7y e a r sa n dn e wﬁrms are not
surveyed, the sample of ﬁrms is diﬀerent in 2001 as compared to 1999. The incompleteness of the
panel stems from the random sampling procedure the consulting company uses when constructing
the samples for the quality surveys. In order to account for the incompleteness of the panel, I
probability weighted each observation according to diﬀerent set of weights.
In order to answer the four questions proposed in the introduction, the empirical strategy is
divided in two parts. The ﬁrst part deals with the information aggregated at the Relationship
Manager level. Using personal and portfolio characteristics, the unit of observation at this stage
of the analysis is the relationship manager. The second part uses ﬁrm level data for the analysis.
19Though qualitative evidence, I also asked informally relationship managers who is/are the person(s) from the
ﬁrms in charge of answering the quality surveys. The answered was that they are generally people who have daily
contact with the Relationship Managers. My main concern was whether a person without substantial knowledge
of the daily business relationship could be in charge of answering the questions, but I found no evidence for this
hypothesis.
20A point should be noted on the issue of observability of eﬀort. If eﬀort was observable, it would be a contractible
measure, aﬀecting the payment scheme. However, as such measures are subject to the RM’s inﬂuence it may not be
optimal from the perspective of the bank to formally include them as a true signal of eﬀort in their payment scheme,
aﬀecting their incentives. In turn, as they are not formally used, RMs do not have the incentives to alter them as
they otherwise would and, as a consequence, such measures end up closer to a true reﬂection of eﬀort.
21The RM who was ﬁred had on average an overall performance below the mean compared to all relationship
managers in the Corporate Bank Division in 1999.
16Firm speciﬁc characteristics are used to answer questions regarding the implications for eﬀort of
the organizational change.
4 Decentralized versus Centralized Control
4.1 Relationship Manager Level Evidence
A ﬁrst look at the data is taken through the RM level analysis, where the unit of observation is
the relationship manager or the senior banker. As few observations are used at this stage, results
may not be as robust as desired. The total number of account oﬃcers in the Corporate Bank used
in the analysis is 26 for 1999 and 24 for 2001. These ﬁgures exclude Unit Heads.
To test for the delegation of authority theory I divided the cases into Introduction of Senior
Bankers, or full delegation case, and Switching of Regime, or partial delegation case. The main goal
is to study the eﬀect of the change in authority on the perceived eﬀo r tm e a s u r e s .T h ei d e n t i ﬁcation
strategy relies on using one business unit that did not change its hierarchical structure and where no
change in responsibility took place as the control group. Introducing this control group, I account for
environmental changes that may blur the results found for simple before-after estimates. The basic
idea behind the identiﬁcation strategy can be illustrated by a simple two-by two table. In Table I,
I present results for the unconditional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence analysis. Although these results are
imprecise since only a small part of the information available is utilized, it is useful to illustrate
the direction of the change in selected eﬀort measures. The table shows means from selected
perceived eﬀort measures and from letters of complaints for each treated and control group. The
main experiment consists on comparing individuals who became Senior Bankers (Panel A) to those
who were not aﬀected by the change. Results suggest that those individuals who were promoted
to Senior Bankers exerted higher eﬀort than those that were not. The same occurs for the case
of RMs who switched from the Initial to the Changed Regime (Panel B). Before the hierarchical
change, the main complaint that relationship managers received referred to poor or no attention
in their handling of the account. The objective of the change was to improve the time allocation
of the RMs by increasing the time spent with clients and the time devoted to the account, as well
as on solving the ﬁrms’ requirements and needs. This was indeed the case. Unconditional results
show that perceived eﬀort measures increased between 2.61% and 6.59% for the SBs and 1.22%
to 12.07% for the RMs under diﬀerent measures. The measure T i m eD e v o t e dt ot h eA c c o u n t&
Ability to Communicate increased 6.59% and 8.95% after the change for SBs and RMs respectively.
The speed of the managers’ response to clients’ requests increased too after the change between
2.93% and 12.07% for SBs and RMs respectively. This result sheds light on the importance of the
17reduction in overruling and overlapping of activities.
A relevant concern for the analysis at this stage is whether selection of individuals who became
Senior Bankers, or among the individuals that were assigned to teams of diﬀerent sizes, could
ultimately be driving the results. Table II displays means of selected personal and RM bank
statistics including, age, experience in the bank, number of accounts held, percentage of the portfolio
that displays Cross Border Risk Approval and the percentages of the portfolio held in each credit
type classiﬁcation,22 for each sample of interest. For 1999, the column all RMs is subdivided into
two subsets, RMs assigned to a single relationship and RMs who will eventually be promoted to a
Senior Banker position. The column Control is composed of the RMs in the unit not aﬀected by
the change.23 For 2001, the three columns, SBs, RMs and Control, represent mutually exclusive
sets of account oﬃcers. I perform tests for the equality of distributions to analyze the sorting of
individuals, as well as the adequacy of the control group used throughout the analysis.
In order to compare the diﬀerent samples for each year and address whether selection issues
might be driving the results, Table II, Panel A, displays the results of a Mann-Whitney test for the
equality of distributions. In particular, two speciﬁc cases are analyzed: the selection of RMs who
became Senior Bankers and the selection of RMs assigned to 1-1 relationships in 1999. The sample
of oﬃcers that were promoted to Senior Bankers is found to diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the RMs sample
only in terms of age (34.6 vs 31.9) and experience in the bank (7.29 vs 6.21). Such oﬃcers are older
and have on average one more year of experience in the bank. Nevertheless, in terms of the ﬁrms
they handle, no signiﬁcant diﬀerences are found. RM level data shows no evidence that relationship
managers who became Senior Bankers handle a set of ﬁrms that are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent to the
ones other RMs handle, neither in terms of the quality of their portfolio nor in terms of the number
of accounts.
For the case of team size assignment, signiﬁcant diﬀerences are found for the RMs working
under a 1-1 hierarchical relationship relative to the sample of all RMs in terms of experience (7.61
vs 6.21), percentage of cross-border risk approval (0.20 vs 0.36) and in the percentages of credit
portfolio classiﬁcation types. Both credit portfolio types II and III are statistically diﬀerent (0.14
vs 0.08 and 0.02 vs 0.01, respectively). In particular, these oﬃcers are found to hold portfolios that
require higher eﬀort exertion, due to the smaller share of cross-border approvals, the higher share
of accounts where concerns were raised on the client and the higher share of substandard accounts
22Portfolio Classiﬁcations are divided into Credit Classiﬁcation Types I, II, III and IV corresponding to Current,
Issues Raised on Client, Substandard and Doubtful, respectively. Cross-Border Risk Approval accounts for the
Commercial Risk approval by any foreign branch of the bank outside Argentina for the credit facilities of the underlying
ﬁrm. For a detailed description of each of these variables see the Data Appendix.
23The Business Unit used as control group receives the name of Global Relationship Bank (GRB Unit).
18in their portfolio. Thus, RM level data shows that such oﬃcers hold accounts that may diﬀer
signiﬁcantly from the ones held by the remaining RMs in characteristics that aﬀect eﬀort exertion.
Data suggests that they were assigned more problematic accounts in terms of quantity and quality
of exposure. Therefore, selection may be theu l t i m a t ed r i v i n gf o r c eo no b s e r v e dd i ﬀerences found
for eﬀort of oﬃcers working under a 1-1 relationship as compared to the remaining oﬃcers in 1999.
Finally, the adequacy of the control group is examined. Table II, Panel B, reports Mann-
Whitney tests for the equality of distributions of each sample of interest to the control group
sample, in both years. For both the SBs and the RMs sample, signiﬁcant diﬀerences are found in
terms of Cross Border Risk Approval in both years. Such results are not surprising given the type
of business unit used as a control group.24 Despite this diﬀerence, RM level data shows that the
control group has no other relevant diﬀerence. Furthermore, diﬀerences in ex-ante types do not
matter as one of the empirical strategies I follow is a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation over time.
I test for the statistical signiﬁcance of the organizational change estimating the following before-
after regression, separately for each group:
Yit = α + γi + δPostt + θXit + εit (1)
where Yit is the individual performance measure for relationship manager i in year t, such as
some measure of perceived eﬀort or the total number of complaints received. γi are Business
Unit/Industry speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects accounting for possible diﬀerences in eﬀo r tm e a s u r e sa c r o s st h e
industries for all RMs, δ is the parameter of interest since Postt is a dummy variable that indicates
the post hierarchical change year and θ is a vector of k parameters for k independent observable
characteristics. This regression compares separately the performance of Senior Bankers and of
those RMs to whom partial delegation of authority and responsibility were given, before and after
the hierarchical change. The above speciﬁcation was also run using γi as Individual RM/SB ﬁxed
eﬀects instead of business unit/industry ﬁxed eﬀects. Tables III and IV summarize the results for
the Senior Banker Case and the RMs Regime Switch Case respectively.
Although I constructed an average from the eﬀort measures for all the questions corresponding
speciﬁcally to the RMs’ role and action in managing the account, the particular measure “time
the RM devotes to the account and ability to communicate and access her/him” is reported in the
24I could have used as control group another unit which also did not change its hierarchical structure, the Financial
Institution Business Unit. The reason for not using this BU resides in the diﬀerent nature of the business itself
that these institutions tackle in terms of the products they require from the bank. Cross-selling ratios of ﬁnancial
institutions are generally higher than those of corporate clients since they use more non-lending products as funding
& gapping and transactional banking services. Lending products do not play a signiﬁcant role for these cases. Thus,
eﬀort measures would not be reﬂecting the same activities as those on corporate clients.
19regressions, since it is the measure that speciﬁcally addresses the reason for which the organizational
structure changed. I also used the average performance measure as well as other speciﬁcm e a s u r e s
from the survey as alternative dependent variables to check for robustness of the results.25
Introduction of Senior Bankers. Table III shows that the results obtained for the Senior
Bankers case give support to the delegation theory of Aghion and Tirole. The fact that full
responsibility of the account was given to these oﬃcers made them exert higher eﬀort. This result
is strong for all speciﬁcations, reported in Columns (1)-(6). Robust standard errors are clustered
at the SB individual level. Column (1) is the most stripped down version of equation (1). Perceived
eﬀort increased 9.9% compared to the unconditional average of SBs before the change. Column (2)
uses the aggregate perceived eﬀort measure as a dependent variable. A dummy to control for the
fact that oﬃcers originally belonged to diﬀerent hierarchical structures is included in the regressions.
Single Hierarchy 1999 takes the value of 1 if the oﬃcer was under a 1-1 hierarchical relationship
in 1999. This variable is found to be positively statistically signiﬁcant, implying that such oﬃcers
exerted higher eﬀort than those oﬃcers working under larger team sizes in the same year. Results
remain statistically signiﬁcant using this alternative perceived eﬀort measures. Column (3) controls
for Industry ﬁxed eﬀects in order to take into account possible diﬀerences in eﬀort measures across
units for all RMs. The causal impact of the change does not disappear or change its direction.
Individual ﬁxed eﬀects -not reported- yield the same qualitative results as using Industry Fixed
Eﬀects.
To consider possible peer pressure eﬀects and free riding issues, I introduce controls for the
size of the unit and number of accounts held by each RM.26 Size of Unit is used as an alternative
control instead of business unit/industry ﬁxed eﬀects. Personal observable characteristics as age,
experience in bank and gender are also included. The marginal impact on eﬀort of handling a larger
number of accounts, shown in Columns (4)-(6) is found to be negative, although not statistically
signiﬁcant. The measure Size of Unit does not have a signiﬁcant impact either. Regarding the
eﬀects of monitoring on the accounts, I include the share of the portfolio that is approved outside
the local branch and the portfolio quality each RM handles. Those accounts in which credit
approval is partially carried outside the local branch -the local branch covers only the sovereign
25Among other perceived eﬀort measures, I used: time the RM devotes to the account and ability to communicate
and access the RM; attitude and character of the RM in the ﬁrm-bank relationship; knowledge of the relationship
and ﬁrm’s needs for ﬁnancial and transactional banking services; solutions proposed and provided by the RM; speed
o ft h eR M ’ sr e s p o n s et oﬁrm’s requests; eﬃcient coordination of the sectors involved in providing solutions and an
overall aggregate RM performance measure that speciﬁcally relates to the role of the RM.
26The measure of number of accounts can be misleading. As there is heterogeneity in the type and quality of
accounts each RM handles, I also used Total Portfolio Outstanding each RM manages. The reason is quite simple.
Although accounts with non-credit facilities imply some work, it is not qualitatively the same as those with credit
exposure.
20risk, but not the commercial risk of the company- may induce the RM to exert less eﬀort in the
way she handles the account. Results suggest this is indeed the case. Columns (5) and (6) show
that the impact of the Percentage of Cross Border Approval is found to be negatively statistically
signiﬁcant, corroborating that oﬃcers exert less eﬀort when the commercial risk of the company
is not covered by the local branch. Column (6) also includes controls for the share of the loan
p o r t f o l i oh e l di ne a c hc l a s s i ﬁcation type. Although not reported, evidence of a concavity eﬀect was
found. RMs exert comparatively less eﬀort on current accrual accounts compared to substandard
and non-accrual accounts. Namely, less eﬀort is exerted when the account is current relative to
substandard or when issues were raised on the account, which is the case where maximum and
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀort is exerted.
To check for the robustness of the results, the number of letters of complaints received by the
bank from their clients is used as a dependent variable. I averaged across relationship managers
the total number of letters where the complaint was speciﬁcally about the role of the RM. I also
created a subset of those complaints. An indicator was created for the time complaint, i.e. for all
the letters received by the Customer Service Division, for each RM, a value of 1 was assigned if the
letter referred to a criticism in the time and attention the RM devoted to the account. There are
two advantages of using these alternative measures as dependent variables. First, the source of the
data is independent of the quality surveys, and second, they should be interpreted as a measure
that is correlated with eﬀort and one which the hierarchical change had an eﬀect on. Using both
measures gives good variability since ﬁrms generally complain about those RMs that, although
being responsive, do not handle problems correctly. So in the total number of complaints there is
some sort of variability on both tails, since one tends to receive complaints from the very good
oﬃcers (due to more interactions) and also from the very bad ones. Column (7) reports the results
obtained when number of complaints are used as a dependent variable and Column (8) reports the
results found for a Probit estimation using the time complaint dummy as a dependent variable.
Results for these alternative measures suggest that both the total number of complaints as well as
the time complaints decreased signiﬁcantly for the Senior Bankers after the organizational change
took place. In these two speciﬁcations both Size of Unit and Number of Accounts have a positive
and signiﬁcant impact on the number of complaints and the time complaint received. Nevertheless,
the economic impact of the Number of Accounts is close to 0.
Although results should be taken with the caveat that only 18 observations are used, as indi-
viduals are followed at this stage, data is consistent with the incentive view of delegation.
RMs Regime Switch. For this case, two eﬀects are considered. First, in the Changed Regime,
UHs have their own accounts, implying that RMs are less monitored. Second, all RMs moved to
211-2 relationships, where larger team sizes also implies less monitoring. Thus, an RM who came
from a 1-1 relationship experienced both eﬀects, while one coming from a 1-2 relationship was
exposed to only one. Theory is unclear about the direction of the relative change in eﬀort after the
change since RMs, originally in diﬀerent structures, may exert diﬀerent absolute levels of eﬀort.
Traditional theory suggests that less monitored account oﬃcers should exert less eﬀort. The eﬀect
of the change in structure would then be higher for individuals that come from a 1-1 hierarchical
relationship, as they experience both eﬀects. Aghion and Tirole’s delegation of authority theory
implies that as one is or feels more responsible for an account, initiative leads to exerting higher
eﬀort, even though there is less monitoring. The ability to take decisions that would otherwise
be taken by a direct boss leads to higher eﬀort exertion as one takes the initiative. This eﬀect is
valid for both types of hierarchies and is independent of original team size. After the change in
structure, RMs are more responsible for the accounts they handle and therefore have more initiative.
Whether the relationship manager was previously w o r k i n gi na1 - 1o ra1 - 2r e l a t i o n s h i pm a yi m p a c t
his change in performance as pre-change eﬀort means may be diﬀerent across the two groups of
oﬃcers. Therefore, both the absolute and the relative increase in eﬀort should be addressed.
Table IV examines the impact of the switching of regime, using eﬀort measures as dependent
variables in Columns (1) to (4) and letters of complaints in Columns (5) and (6). Column (1) is the
most stripped down version suggesting that the organizational structure change is also consistent
with the incentive view of delegation. Perceived eﬀort measures increased 6.87% relative to the
unconditional mean of the treated group prior to the change. Column (2) shows that introducing
personal characteristics and the number of accounts handled by each RM does not change the
statistical and economic signiﬁcance of the results. In Column (3) I control for the percentage of
Cross-Border Approval. Results again suggest again that signiﬁcantly lower eﬀort is exerted when
the commercial risk of the company is approved outside the branch. For the portfolio classiﬁcations,
although not reported on the table, evidence for concavity on eﬀort allocation is present although
not statistically signiﬁcant. To control for possible pre-existing diﬀerences in eﬀort exertion,27 in
Column (4) I include an additional control for the original team size of the RM. Results do not
diﬀer signiﬁcantly across these diﬀerent speciﬁcations. On average all RMs, irrespective of their
original team size, exert more eﬀort under the new organizational structure. Columns (5) and (6)
show that both total complaints and time complaint are signiﬁcantly reduced after the change.
27Though not reported in the tables due to selection concerns, I also performed a within year test in 1999. Results
show that those RMs working under a 1-1 relationship exert signiﬁcantly higher eﬀort than those in a 1-2 or 1-5
hierarchical structures. This results gives support to the traditional agency view theory of better monitored managers
higher eﬀort exertion. Nevertheless, the selection concern raised for the team assignments in 1999, casts some doubts
on these results.
22In the ﬁrm level data analysis I will further disentangle the diﬀerential change in eﬀort emerging
from those RMs that were previously working under a 1-1 relationship compared to those working
with another RM in the business unit. The small number of observations at this stage prevents an
identiﬁcation of such diﬀerential eﬀect.
As eﬀort is obtained from perceived measures, two caveats should be pointed out. First, the
change has enabled both Senior Bankers and RMs to have more time to spend with their clients,
understanding their ﬁnancial needs and strengthening the relationship. They may do so, but
perhaps not in a productive way in terms of the bank’s proﬁtability. Activities such as spending
the afternoon playing golf, extended-lunch hours, or attending social gatherings may not necessarily
imply devoting productive time to increase the proﬁtability of the bank, but may lead to an increase
in the perceived eﬀort measures. The last section of the paper deals with the real impact of
delegating more authority to the oﬃcers and increasing their freedom to allocate time among
clients. The second caveat deals with the perception that ﬁrms have on the eﬀort the RMs exert.
Independently of the perception of the ﬁrms, the quality survey is comparable across years and the
analysis is done in relative terms across RMs, hence the perception issue can be ignored for our
testing purposes.
One of the main problems that before-after estimations present is the lack of controls for con-
temporaneous environmental changes that may pollute the estimates. Using as control group the
business unit that did not change either its hierarchical structure or the role of responsibilities and
incentives within their team members, the following diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation is performed:
Yit = α + γi + γ0Treatedi + δPostt + θXit + β(Treatedi ∗ Postt)+εit (2)
where Yit,γ i,δand θ stand for the same deﬁnitions as in (1). The variable Treatedi, according to the
speciﬁc case under analysis, is replaced by either Senior Bankers or Relationship Managers switching
from Regime A to B. Treatedi captures pre-existing diﬀerences associated with the treated account
oﬃcer, introducing a control for possible selection issues. It assigns a value of 1 in both years to the
treated individual, either the ones who were eventually promoted to Senior Bankers or the RMs who
switched from Regime A to Regime B. Therefore, the interaction term (Treatedi ∗ Postt) can be
interpreted as the causal eﬀect of the change in hierarchical structure on the average performance
of the treated individuals.
Tables V and VI display the results of such diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimations using as de-
pendent variables: (i) the perceived eﬀort regarding the time the RM spends and devotes to the
account; (ii) an aggregate measure of eﬀort involving only those characteristics of the relationship
23that are speciﬁc to the RM; (iii) the total number of complaints; and (iv) the time complaint
dummy.
Table V displays the ﬁndings relative to the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimations for the Senior
Bankers case. Columns (1) through (6) exhibit results using perceived eﬀo r tm e a s u r e sa st h e
dependent variable, Columns (7) and (8) use the number of letters of complaints and the time
complaint respectively as the dependent variable. Under the same speciﬁcations tested in equation
(1), the performance of the Senior Bankers is shown to improve after the change in structure, as
measured by a signiﬁcant increase -between 6.09% and 8.07%- in their eﬀort measures or a signiﬁcant
decrease in the number of general or time complaints received. The positive impact on eﬀort is
robust to the introduction of personal controls, as well as various bank-RM controls -Number of
Accounts, Size of Unit and Cross-Border Portfolio-, as shown in Columns (1) through (6). Columns
(4) to (6) introduce a control for whether the oﬃcer was originally working under a 1-1 relationship.
Again, results show that such oﬃcers presented higher eﬀort measures in 1999. Columns (7) and (8)
show that the number of complaints and time complaints signiﬁcantly decreased for those managers
that became Senior Bankers. Such results are robust to the introduction of personal, as well as
bank-RM controls.
Table VI displays the results found for the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimations for the RMs’
Regime Switch case. Columns (1) to (4) exhibit results using perceived eﬀort measures as the
dependent variable. Column (1) is the most stripped down version controlling for pre-existing
diﬀerences in eﬀort exertion in 1999. Column (2) includes RM ﬁxed eﬀects and Columns (3)-(4)
include a diﬀerent set of personal and bank RM control variables. Independent of the speciﬁcation
analyzed, results suggest that eﬀort measures for the RM regime switch increased. Columns (5) and
(6) also show that the total number of complaints and the time complaint signiﬁcantly decreased.
Perceived eﬀort measures are shown to have increased signiﬁcantly after the change in structure
took place and both general and time complaints are shown to have signiﬁcantly decreased under
all speciﬁcations. Results are robust to the introduction of both personal and bank RM controls,
as well as RM ﬁxed eﬀects. These ﬁndings are consistent with the incentive view of delegation
proposed by Aghion and Tirole [1997].
4.2 Firm Level Evidence
I ﬁrst estimate the eﬀect of the organizational change on eﬀort including speciﬁc ﬁrm characteristics.
As the unit of observation is now the ﬁrm, I follow those ﬁrms that were surveyed in 1999 and
2001. I estimate the eﬀect of the change on the Senior Bankers and on the switching of regimes
case separately. Using ﬁrm level data allows for estimating both the relative diﬀerential increase in
24eﬀort across regimes for relationship managers and for introducing in the analysis ex-post monitoring
issues regarding the way relationship managers monitor and exert eﬀort on their accounts.
As in the individual RM analysis, selection might be again a concern as both the sorting of
ﬁrms to be assigned to individuals promoted to senior bankers, as well as the sorting of ﬁrms to
be assigned to relationship managers working in units with diﬀerent team sizes are not randomly
done. Therefore, the matching process may be ultimately driving the results. Table VII displays
means of selected statistics of ﬁrm observable characteristics for each sample of interest. For 1999,
the column RM includes all ﬁrms except for those in the control group; the subset SB refers to
ﬁrms that would be assigned to a Senior Banker in 2001 and the subset Single RM refers to the
ﬁrms handled by relationship managers working under a 1-1 hierarchy in 1999. The column Control
Group corresponds to ﬁrms in the unit that did not experience any change in structure. For 2001,
the three columns represent mutually exclusive sets of ﬁrms. Several tests are performed to analyze
the sorting of ﬁrms assigned to each group of individuals and the adequacy of the control group.
First in Panel A, I perform a Mann-Whitney test for equality of distributions in order to compare
the samples in each year. For the sorting of ﬁrms to Senior Bankers, no signiﬁcant diﬀerences are
found for 1999. That is, ﬁrms that would be assigned to Senior Bankers in 2001 do not diﬀer in
terms of their 1999 observable characteristics to the ﬁrms that were not assigned to Senior Bankers.
Thus, ﬁrm level data analysis shows no support of speciﬁc selection of ﬁrms that were assigned to
Senior Bankers in terms of observable characteristics, corroborating the results found at the RM
level data analysis.
In terms of assignment to diﬀerent team sizes in 1999, statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences are
found for (foreign) ownership of the companies, for the average assets that each ﬁrm has as out-
standing position with the bank, for the maturity and for the current ratio. The ﬁrm level data
corroborates the suspicion raised at the RM level data, as it indicates that ﬁrms assigned to oﬃcers
in smaller team sizes diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the ﬁrms assigned to oﬃcers in larger team sizes in
the year 1999. In particular, RMs working under a 1-1 hierarchical relationship are responsible for
handling accounts that require higher exertion of eﬀort, as measured by their diﬀerences in observ-
able characteristics, mainly the fact that on average they are dealing with ﬁr m st h a th a v eah i g h e r
outstanding exposure with the bank. Moreover, all variables that diﬀer signiﬁcantly across the two
groups are associated with characteristics that impact eﬀort on the same direction. Smaller per-
centage of foreign ownership accounts28 (0.18 vs 0.44), higher average assets (47.2 vs 25.4), smaller
28Generally, foreign owned ﬁrms have letters of support or comfort letters from headquarters to their branches
around the world. Although this support must not be considered as a sign of collateral, it gives some idea of the
c o m m i t m e n tt h a tt h eh e a do ﬃce has with its worldwide branches.
25proportion of long term debt (0.13 vs 0.25) and smaller current-ratio (0.38 vs 0.45) all indicate
that the account oﬃcer should exert higher eﬀort, all else being equal. Thus, data indicates that
selection plays a role in the assignment of ﬁrms to single RMs in 1999. These diﬀerences, though,
do not aﬀect the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimations for each of both changes.
The empirical analysis is done following the same procedure taken at the RM level, using a
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach where ﬁrms are followed instead. For each of the surveyed ﬁrms,
Iu s et h ee ﬀort measure attributed to the RM who handles the account as a dependent variable.
The basic regression used for estimating the impact of the change in structure on eﬀort using ﬁrm
level data is given by:
Yit = α+γi +γ0Treatedi +δPostt +β1(Treatedi ∗Postt)+β2(Zi ∗Postt)+β3Zi +θXit +εit (3)
where Yit is the perceived eﬀort measure for ﬁrm i in year t, γi are Business Unit/Industry ﬁxed
eﬀects, δ accounts for the year eﬀect since Postt is an indicator for the post hierarchical change
period, β1 identiﬁes the direct eﬀect of the hierarchical change on the eﬀort measure and Treatedi
reﬂects either the ﬁrm treated by a Senior Banker or the RM Regime Switch case. Treatedi is a
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in both years for ﬁrms that were assigned to a Senior
Banker or an RM switching regime, accordingly to the case under consideration. This variable
captures pre-existing diﬀerences associated to those ﬁrms assigned to each group. If this group of
ﬁrms corresponds to a special set of ﬁrms, this dummy tries to capture the “Firm Selection” eﬀect.
Therefore, the interaction term captures the direct eﬀect of the change in hierarchical structure.
Zi is a dummy variable that classiﬁes the ﬁrm under analysis according to its status on some
underlying soft or hard characteristic. Among soft, or qualitative, characteristics are Management
Risk Assessment, Competitive Position Risk Assessment, Risk Management Policies Assessment
and Access to Capital Markets. These soft characteristics represent averages of a set of speciﬁc
questions that evaluate each characteristic.29 Hard, or quantitative, characteristics include Sales-to-
Assets, Debt-to-Equity, Return-on-Equity and EBITDA-to-Sales. The variable Zi takes a value of 1
if the underlying characteristic is in the top half of the distribution in the year prior to the change in
structure. Thus, (Zi ∗Postt) captures whether the result is being driven by pre-existing diﬀerences
in the underlying characteristic of interest Zi.X it is a vector of k independent observable ﬁrm
characteristics including long term debt as measured by maturity higher than 3 years, credit risk
rating of the ﬁrm, collateral support/clean exposure, length of relationship, ownership and years
in industry. Otherwise noted, the control group used in the analysis is the business unit that did
29In the Data Appendix I describe in detail the questions that each qualitative characteristic speciﬁcally addresses.
26not change either its hierarchical structure or the responsibility roles. Finally, the incompleteness
of the panel does not allow me to introduce ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects that would otherwise be desired.
The underlying assumptions in (3) which allow me to interpret β1 a st h ed i r e c ti m p a c to ft h e
hierarchical change may be outlined as follows. (i) Despite some statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences
on certain observable characteristics as described in Table VII, there are no other diﬀerences among
treated and control ﬁrms. They are not ﬁrms in a completely diﬀerent standpoint in their relation-
ship with the bank. Firms are comparable, and they belong to similar industries, with a respectable
credit history in the bank. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach allows me to control for industry
speciﬁc shocks and relationship characteristics. (ii) Most of the ﬁrms in the sample have multiple
sources of funding, including other strong bank relationships and access to local and international
capital markets. Switching banks for these ﬁrms is easy and costless, so there is no “hold-up”
or “lock-in” eﬀect which might bias the answers obtained from the surveys. (iii) All ﬁrms in the
sample correspond to private large ﬁrms in competitive industries. It is diﬃcult then to justify as
in Uzzi [1999, 2002] the presence of social externalities and networks in the ﬁrm-bank relationships
in large business lending. (iv) Dependent variables are perceived eﬀort measures from the clients’
perspectives, thus, the outside economic environment may play a role and aﬀect the answers. The
period 1999-2001 in Argentina was one of great social discontent and, if anything, perception of
RM’s work could have been adversely aﬀected by the outside environment. Thus, I am conﬁdent
that there is no “grade inﬂation” in the eﬀort measures between 1999 and 2001. (v) Although
perceived eﬀort measures, they end up closer to a true reﬂection of eﬀort. As these measures are
not formally used in the payment or compensation scheme, RMs do not have the incentives to
inﬂuence them as they otherwise would, jeopardizing the true spirit of the measure.
Table VIII reports the results from estimation of equation (3) for the Introduction of the Senior
Banker case. Column (1) is the most stripped down version of running (3). Results do not diﬀer
signiﬁcantly if to this stripped down version I add either industry ﬁxed eﬀects -Column (2)- or
individual RM ﬁxed eﬀects -not reported-. Both results show a positive impact on the perceived
eﬀort measures of the SBs. The coeﬃcient on the Treatedi variable is close to 0 and not statistically
signiﬁcant detecting no pre-existing diﬀerences at the ﬁrm level.
Although this result is signiﬁcant, one must consider three factors which the regression must
account for. (i) A ﬁrm may be managed by a diﬀe r e n tR Ma td i ﬀerent moments in time. The
role of the RM in the ﬁrm-bank relationship might impact diﬀerently the ﬁrms’ perception on the
eﬀort they exert. Thus, we need to control for individual RM ﬁxed eﬀects. (ii) As some ﬁrms are
surveyed in both years I report clustered standard errors where the ﬁrm is the unit of clustering,
in order to take into account such link and explore common characteristics. (iii) As we are dealing
27with an incomplete panel of ﬁrms, OLS estimates might be biased if there is correlation between
ﬁrms with missing observations and the eﬀort measures. To control for this factor, I use probability
weights for each ﬁrm to account for the missing observation it represents.30 In order for the results
to be taken seriously, these factors are introduced in the estimation.
Column (3) includes Industry and Individual SB ﬁxed eﬀects and probability weights each
observation. Results under this speciﬁcation show that on average full delegation of responsibility
to Senior Bankers has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on eﬀort. Moreover, pre-existing diﬀerences
at the ﬁrm level accounted by the coeﬃcient on the treated variable are not signiﬁcant and close
to 0. As I cannot use ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects due to the lack of repeated observations, Column (4) adds
6 control variables that I collected from credit folders approvals. These controls include long term
maturity of debt (covenants), the credit risk rating of the ﬁrm - a dummy variable that assigns
a value of 1 if the ﬁrm is an investment grade company-, percentage of collateralized exposure,
length of relationship, years in industry and ownership. Column (4) is the stripped down version
of equation (3) adding these ﬁrm characteristics. The eﬀect on the eﬀort measures do not fade
way. Column (5) controls for the three factors previously mentioned adding also the controls for
ﬁrm characteristics. As evidence of heteroscedasticity at the ﬁrm level in the repeated-cross section
analysis is found to be signiﬁcant, column (6) reports GLS grouped standard errors. GLS clustering
reduces signiﬁcantly the standard errors. Results are robust to these general speciﬁcations.
Firm observable characteristics have an important role on the eﬀort measures. In all spec-
iﬁcations tested, long term debt maturity, credit risk rating and length of relationship have a
statistically signiﬁcant impact on eﬀort. Reasons for those results are described as follows. (i) The
fact that a credit approval facility has a long term debt transaction maturing in 3 years time as
a special transaction31 raises an issue on the type of covenants the account manager must check
and follow-up. Covenants in contracts of 3 year long term transactions are not standard ﬁnancial
covenants. Regular working capital credit lines have standard documentation with MAC [Material
of Adverse Change] clauses and plain ﬁnancial covenants. Structured long term special transac-
tions may have qualitative covenants inducing additional eﬀort from the SB/RM in their follow-up.
Thus, it induces a positive and signiﬁcant impact on the perceived eﬀort measures. (ii) Investment
30I constructed three diﬀerent sets of weights. Reported on Table VIII are probability weights according to the
number of times the ﬁrm appears on the survey. The two other weights used and not reported on the table refer to:
(i) the diﬀerent number of times the RM appears in the survey controlling for the fact that some individuals were
more surveyed than other ones; e.g. if 3 ﬁrms from the same RM were surveyed then each ﬁrm received a weight of
1/3; (ii) and their diﬀerent likelihood of being surveyed represented by the ratio of the number of ﬁrms surveyed over
the total number of accounts for each RM.
31Credit approvals are generally divided in working capital credit facilities and special transaction lines which vary
in their tenor.
28Grade Rating ﬁrms require less ex-post monitoring activities and exposure of the ﬁrm with the
bank, impacting negatively and signiﬁcantly in the perceived eﬀort measures. (iii) The positive
coeﬃcient on Length of Relationship seems striking at ﬁrst sight. First, as these are perceived
eﬀort measures the fact that the ﬁrm-bank relationship is longer can have an impact on it.32 Sec-
ond, account oﬃcers tend to sell more lending and non-lending products to those ﬁrms in which
a longer relationship is established and developed, as there is more knowledge involved and more
interaction between both parties. Both eﬀects move in the same direction of increasing perceived
eﬀort measures.
A potential concern regarding the results shown in columns (1) through (6) is that omitted
pre-existing diﬀerences might be driving the ﬁndings on eﬀort. Columns (7) and (8) control for
such confounding eﬀects by including pre-existing diﬀerences of both hard and soft information
variables from clients’ credit folders. These pre-existing diﬀerences Zi are dummy variables that
take a value of 1 if the ﬁrm is in the upper half of the distribution in 1999 for the underlying
characteristic of interest. Thus, the interaction term (Zi ∗ Postt) captures whether the eﬀect of
those pre-existing diﬀerences is driving the results on eﬀort after the hierarchical change takes place.
Zi is also included separately in the regression. Results suggest that neither pre-existing diﬀerences
on hard nor soft information about the ﬁrms are driving the ﬁndings on eﬀort. The magnitude of
the impact is not statistically diﬀerent from the results obtained under previous speciﬁcations.
The increase in eﬀort is robust to a wide range of speciﬁcations. If the validity of the control
group is under question I used then the RMs which were not promoted to SBs as a control group,
thus excluding the GRB Unit. Results are robust to the speciﬁcations tested in Table VIII. A ﬁnal
check for robustness is the introduction of the average performance measure of eﬀort I constructed
as a dependent variable instead of the time the RM devotes to the relationship. Results remain
positive and signiﬁcant.
The magnitude of the organizational change is sizeable given that the mean perceived eﬀort of
those individuals who became SBs before the change was 6.09. A better sense of the magnitude of
the change is that it represents a jump from the 35th to almost 50th percentile in the distribution
of the perceived eﬀort measure.
Regarding the RMs Regime Switch, Table IX shows the results from running equation (3). The
control group for this analysis is the GRB Unit. I excluded all ﬁrms related to SBs. Using the same
procedure as the Introduction of Senior Banker case, I can now disentangle the diﬀerential eﬀect on
eﬀort of RMs coming from a 1-1 relationship as compared to those originally in a 1-2 relationship
32A causality issue could be raised at this point. I will ignore it for the moment.
29by introducing two additional interaction terms. Instead of computing the average eﬀect of all RMs
using (Treatedi ∗ Postt), I classify treated individuals in those coming from a 1-1 and those from
a 1-2 relationship, and introduce both interaction terms, (Single-Multiplei ∗ Postt) and (Multiple-
Multiplei ∗ Postt) in regression (3). Table IX, Panel A shows the average impact of the change,
while Panel B shows the diﬀerential impact on eﬀort. In the diﬀerential eﬀort impact case I do not
use Industry Fixed Eﬀects since they could be correlated with the team assignments and with the
distribution of industries among RMs polluting the results. When no RM ﬁxed eﬀects are present
in the regression, an indicator for relationship managers in a single 1-1 hierarchical relationship in
1999 is included. This dummy controls for the pre-existing diﬀerences in eﬀort for the two groups.
It allows for the constant to be diﬀerent among the two diﬀerent groups and, therefore, to interpret
the coeﬃcient on the interaction term as a relative increase in eﬀort. Noting this diﬀerence, results
from columns (7) to (11) show that those RMs in a 1-2 relationship exert more eﬀort in 2001 relative
to the other group; i.e. their increase in eﬀort was higher than the increase in eﬀort observed for
the other group. The interaction term (Multiple-Multiplei ∗Postt) for the diﬀerent speciﬁcations is
positive and signiﬁcant as compared to (Single-Multiplei ∗ Postt) which although positive it is not
statistically signiﬁcant. This result suggests that the eﬀort increase is due to the incentive view of
delegation rather than a subjective performance evaluation.
The positive eﬀect on eﬀort emerging from the role of initiative and responsibility outweights
t h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect emerging from the reduction in monitoring, for both groups. As a result,
“empowering managers” increased the eﬀort exertion independent of the hierarchical structure
which account oﬃcers were originally assigned to. Theoretical predictions are not clear regarding the
relative diﬀerential eﬀort across groups. I found that individuals originally in multiple relationships
displayed a higher increase in eﬀo r t . T h ef a c tt h a tt h ei n c r e a s ei ne ﬀort arises from those ﬁrms
managed by RMs in a 1-2 relationship in 1999 rejects the relative performance evaluation theory.
5 Confounding Stories and Heterogeneity Eﬀects
Further selection issues are considered in this section. Since speciﬁc ﬁrm characteristics and internal
bank credit rules are likely to inﬂuence several aspects of the ﬁr m - b a n kr e l a t i o n ,a n di np a r t i c u l a r
the monitoring activities, other factors apart from the organizational change could be driving the
results previously found for the impact on eﬀort measures.
The purpose of this section is twofold. First, I intend to address the selection issues related
to the assignment of ﬁrms to account oﬃcers. In particular, I analyze speciﬁc ﬁrm characteristics
and internal credit rules that might have aﬀected eﬀort exertion and how they diﬀer across the
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relationship managers. I then test for robustness of the eﬀort ﬁndings to the introduction of such
confounding channels as determinants of eﬀort allocation. Second, while taking into account these
ﬁrm characteristics and other internal bank criteria that may have inﬂuenced eﬀort measures, I
shed some light on the process of ex-post monitoring activities for large business lending. Empirical
literature has not yet been able to provide a clear understanding of how such process takes place
in large organizations. This section intends to contribute in that direction too.
A ﬁrst unconditional view of the data, displayed in Table X, shows no striking diﬀerences in
the set of characteristics of ﬁrms assigned to Senior Bankers compared to the ﬁrms assigned to
the remaining account oﬃcers in the year prior to the change. Each underlying characteristic
of a ﬁrm is represented by a dummy variable, where a value of 1 is assigned if it belongs to
the top half of the distribution of all ﬁrms in that aspect in the year of 1999. Exceptions are
Average Assets (MM), Return on Assets (%) and Return on Equity (%), where average values are
shown. Diﬀerences associated with some qualitative characteristics such as Management, Industry,
Competitive Position and Key Success Factors Assessment of the ﬁrms are also examined. Using a
Mann-Whitney test for the equality of distributions performed across the two samples of interest,
I found no evidence of pre-existing diﬀerences in the characteristics of the set of ﬁrms that were
assigned to Senior Bankers in 2001 relative to the remaining ﬁrms.
The alternative reasons that aﬀect the extent and eﬀectiveness of monitoring as well as might
have an impact on perceived eﬀort measures, can be classiﬁed in the following groups:
(i) Frequency of Interactions, as repeated reﬁnancing of debt increases the contact that account
oﬃcers have with the ﬁrm, allowing for a revision of contract terms, credit denials, and for updating
credit information related to the ﬁrm. Better knowledge of the ﬁrm might give an advantage to
the oﬃcer in the speed of approval and evaluating new ﬁnancing alternatives.
(ii) Bargaining Strength & Hold-up Issue, as the extent of control the bank has over the ﬁrm is the
ultimate determinant of its monitoring capability. Banks are able to monitor ﬁr m sa sl o n ga st h e y
can have the ultimate control of the relationship. Although the presence of a hold-up problem is
not common in corporate lending, as large ﬁrms have many outside ﬁnancing options, other factors
may have an impact on the bargaining strength position of the bank.
(iii) Concavity, as banks monitor more closely those ﬁrms that are less proﬁtable.
(iv) Specialization, as banks might be specialized on a speciﬁc industry or market. Although the
portfolio of the bank under analysis is well diversiﬁed, total asset exposure to each speciﬁc industry
has credit limit constraints. Analyzing the portfolio composition of 1999 and 2001, there is no clear
31evidence of specialization on any particular industry.
(v) Internal Bank Criteria, as it is not clear whether account oﬃcers follow strictly hard information
to follow-up ﬁrms or use other vital credit criteria which is internal to the bank and is documented
in credit manual policies.
The procedure adopted in the empirical analysis intends to capture the possible sorting of
ﬁrms to Senior Bankers examining whether the increase in eﬀort previously observed was driven
through these ﬁve channels other than the organizational change. I use speciﬁc information on ﬁrm
characteristics at the year prior to the change in structure related to the determinants, mentioned
above, to estimate the following equation:
Yit = α + γi + γ0Treatedi + δPostt + θXit + β1(Treatedi ∗ Postt)+β2(Zi ∗ Treatedi ∗ Postt)
β3(Zi ∗ Postt)+β4(Zi ∗ Treatedi)+β5Zi + εit
(4)
As in equation (3), Zi is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm is in the top
half of the distribution in the year prior to the change in structure for the characteristic under
consideration. Equation (4) estimates the eﬀect of the change in structure on eﬀort allowing
also for the diﬀerential impact that the alternative channels have on the eﬀort measures. These
channels are represented by the inclusion of ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics measured by Zi. These
Zi’s are related to each of the ﬁve possible determinants mentioned above. Their impact after the
hierarchical change takes place and their eﬀect if the particular ﬁrm was given to a Senior Banker
are captured by the appropriate interaction terms constructed for the variable Zi, (Zi ∗Postt) and
(Zi ∗ Treatedi ∗ Postt), respectively. C o m p a r i n gt h e s et w ot e r m sa n dﬁnding a diﬀerence on the
perceived eﬀort measure reﬂects a diﬀerence on how account oﬃcers with higher authority handle
their accounts.
Several variables are used as Zi to examine alternative channels through which eﬀort measures
might have been inﬂuenced and aﬀected monitoring activities:
Capital Turnover. As higher working capital needs induces more contact between the client and
the account manager increasing the understanding of the relationship, it might be the case that if
there is a frequency of interaction eﬀect, it should appear on those ﬁrms with higher short-term
capital needs. I use the ratio of Sales-to-Assets as a measure of Capital Turnover to test for the
existence of a diﬀerential impact through the frequency of interactions.
Leverage and Size. Banks exert higher control and concentrate their monitoring activities on ﬁrms
that are more leveraged. If this is the case, ﬁrms with higher debt-to-equity ratios are monitored
the most. I use Debt-to-Equity to test for the Bargaining Strength eﬀect. As other potential
32determinants to test for these eﬀect I use ﬁrm’s Net Worth (bigger ﬁrms are likely to have more
outside options), an indicators of Other Bank Relationships and Access to Capital Markets. These
variables provide some evidence for the dependence of the ﬁrm on the bank.
Cash Flow Generation. Sorting could have been done in such a way that Senior Bankers were
assigned the less proﬁtable ﬁrms with low cash ﬂow generation possibilities and with a higher
probability of default. I use Return-on-Equity, Return-on-Assets and EBITDA-to-sales to test for
the Concavity eﬀect.
Industry Classiﬁcations. Industry ﬁxed eﬀects are used to test for the specialization eﬀect.
Generally each bank has its own rules on how to allocate funds and handle accounts, and such
internal criteria need not coincide with any particular quantitative or qualitative characteristic that
one may think of. My previous experience working in the bank triggered a concern on possible
selection of ﬁrms on those grounds, as well as their importance as determinants of monitoring
activities. Therefore, I have also used as alternative variables Zi, internal bank criteria such as:
(i) if there is a signiﬁcant increase in the total amount of money lent to the ﬁrm, (ii) if there is a
downgrade in the ﬁrm’s credit risk rating, (iii) if there is an adverse change of collateral/support
or in the documentation for that ﬁrm, (iv) if the ﬁrm is out of the target market of the bank, (v) if
the amount and tenor is above the approved limit for that credit risk rating ﬁrm, and (vi) if there
is a major risk event at the company. For these cases, Zi is a dummy variable that takes a value of
1i ft h eﬁrm presents a “yes” in the criteria under consideration.
In addition, Access to Capital Markets Risk Assessment is introduced as a control variable in
all of the regressions, as monitoring eﬀorts are likely to be smaller for ﬁr m sw i t ha c c e s st om u l t i p l e
funding options and with public information widely available.
Results for the estimation of equation (4) are presented in Table XI. Column (1) tests for the
theory of monitoring based on Frequency of Interactions using Sales-to-Assets and, although the
eﬀect goes in the direction predicted by theory, it is not statistically signiﬁcant. Columns (2) and
(3) show the results for the Bargaining Strength eﬀect. More leveraged ﬁrms present a positive
diﬀerential eﬀect on perceived eﬀort, as predicted by theory. Despite this positive and signiﬁcant
eﬀect, the coeﬃcient of the direct impact, β1, does not lose its signiﬁcance. The eﬀect of Other
Bank Relations on eﬀort however is close to 0 and it is not statistically signiﬁcant. Using Net
Worth, not reported on the table, indicates that the size of the ﬁrm does not play a role in exerting
ad i ﬀerential eﬀect on eﬀort. Columns (4) and (5) test for the Concavity eﬀect on monitoring. As
predicted by theory, a higher Return-on-Equity has a negative eﬀect on perceived eﬀort measures
and, although not reported, qualitatively similar results are found for Return-on-Assets. The eﬀect
33of EBITDA-to-Sales on eﬀort, although in the direction predicted by theory is not statistically
signiﬁcant. Both ROE and ROA have a higher impact on eﬀort measures than the cash ﬂow
generation measure. Column (6) uses an overall measure of the ﬁnancial position of the ﬁrm taken
from the credit scoring of the bank. Columns (7) to (10) exhibit the results found for the importance
of Internal Bank Criteria on eﬀort. A signiﬁcant increase in the amount lent, a downgrade in the risk
rating and an adverse change in collateral for the ﬁrm all have a positive and signiﬁcant diﬀerential
impact on eﬀort exerted. In terms of magnitude of such eﬀects, change in collateral/support in the
documentation has the strongest impact. Column (9) shows that a signiﬁcant increase in facilities
and a change in collateral aﬀect eﬀort through independent channels. These results highlight
the importance of the role played by relationship managers on monitoring activities. Finally, an
interesting result by itself is the eﬀect of Access to Capital Markets on eﬀort, which is robust to all
alternative speciﬁcations. The existence of alternative funding options is shown to have a negative
impact on monitoring, as predicted by theory.
Two conclusions are drawn from Table XI. The ﬁrst one is the general ﬁnding that alternative
monitoring stories are not driving the results previously obtained for eﬀort. There is a diﬀerential
impact on eﬀort through other channels other than the organizational change, but the direct impact
of does not disappear. Second, the analysis allows for a better understanding of how monitoring
activities evolve in large organizations. Speciﬁcally, leveraged and proﬁtable ﬁrms, internal bank
criteria and access to capital markets are shown to be important determinants of eﬀort exertion
and monitoring activities.
Although there is not much work done in the empirical literature on large business lending,
there is a general view that in large organizations ex-post monitoring does not play a major role. In
other words, that credit allocation decisions follow more objective criteria, or that hard information
dictates decisions. Contrary to such view, the results I ﬁnd show the importance of internal bank
criteria on monitoring activities. The role played by such internal criteria sheds light on the
determinants of monitoring inside large organizations and identify some of the mechanisms through
w h i c hb a n k sm a yi n ﬂuence ﬁrms’ behavior.
6 Decentralization of Control and Usage of Soft Information
This section addresses if the improvement in eﬀort measures is a result of a reduction in bureaucracy,
or because account oﬃcers make better use of their decision making authority by recognizing their
eﬀorts might have an impact on results.
Stein [2002] develops a simple framework that points out the inﬂuence of the organizational
34structure on the process of generating and using diﬀerent forms of information. Under a centralized
hierarchical structure, where there is separation between authority over ﬁnal decisions and research,
incentives will be higher towards gathering information that is easy to store and communicate to
others. An additional cost is imposed on the collection of soft information as extra resources must
be devoted to the process of credibly transmitting it. Under a decentralized structure, research
and authority are held jointly so no additional costs are imposed on the collection of soft relative
to hard information. As a consequence, small hierarchies will perform better when information is
soft, while large ones will do so when information is hard, or, in other words, can easily be passed
on along the structure.33
I exploit the change in the hierarchical setting to link the role that decentralization of authority
has with the usage of soft relative to hard information in pricing decisions. Given the existence
of diﬀerences in transmission costs between soft and hard information, I explore the variability of
authority and team size across business units to test for Stein [2002], analyzing the impact that soft
information has on one of the variables that account oﬃcers can inﬂuence the most, the pricing of
working capital loans. I check whether account oﬃcers who receive more authority use their soft
information diﬀerently than individuals to whom authority is only partially delegated. The nature
of the change provides a suitable setting to evaluate the role and usage of soft information inside a
large organization.
It is clear from the previous analysis that the hierarchical structure change increased the time
relationship managers have to devote to their accounts and to acquire new information regarding the
ﬁrms they handle. Senior Bankers were given full delegation of authority - freedom to allocate their
time and eﬀort over the accounts they handle - and therefore have no need to report or convince
a superior of their ﬁndings. Decisions from SBs occur in a decentralized environment, allowing
for their incentives to collect and their ability to use the collected information to diﬀer from the
ones faced by the remaining relationship managers, those in the regime switch. The advantage of
decentralization is that it strengthens the research incentives of line managers. Oﬃcers to whom
only partial authority was given experienced more time to devote to research activities, but as
they still work under a centralized structure, as part of a team, they know in advance that part of
33Jensen and Meckling [1990] refer to the trade-oﬀ of assigning a particular decision right to diﬀerent levels in the
organizational structure. The trade-oﬀ balances decreasing costs of acquiring speciﬁc knowledge versus increasing
costs of inconsistent objectives as one moves away from centralized towards decentralized structures. They refer
to the allocation of decision rights as: “Ideally this means collocating decision responsibility with the knowledge
that is valuable in making particular decisions. This requires consideration of the costs of generating and transferring
knowledge in the organization, and how the assignment of decision rights inﬂuences incentives to acquire information”.
Aghion and Tirole [1997] also mention the process of communication and the role of authority. These authors do
not refer explicitly to the concepts of transmission and usage of soft relative to hard information across hierarchical
structures.
35their research eﬀort on collecting soft information will be lost in the transmission process to their
superiors. An additional cost is imposed on such oﬃcers on the process of collecting soft information,
as resources must be devoted to providing the necessary documentation, veriﬁable proofs in order
to credibly convince their superiors. In other words, the information must be hardened by these
oﬃcers for it to be communicated to their superiors. Such diﬀerence in the transmission cost of soft
relative to hard information across relationship managers may induce them to gather and to use
soft information in a diﬀerent manner. Therefore, the reliance on soft relative to hard information
on certain decisions depends partly on the authority given to the oﬃcer who is responsible for
generating such information. As their team size is smaller and their authority is higher, Senior
Bankers’ pricing decisions should rely more on qualitative evidence than the decisions of those
account oﬃcers who were not promoted do.
Before proceeding to the empirical strategy and results, three points should be addressed. First,
the reasons for considering the pricing dimension decision instead of another dimension. Second,
the speciﬁc type of pricing to use and last, the process of “hardening” the soft measures used in
the analysis. Reasons are described as follows.
(i) Availability of Credit and Pricing are the two possible dimensions to consider. Both have been
extensively analyzed in the literature for small business lending practices.34 However, in large
corporate lending it is diﬃcult to think on the availability of credit as a dimension of decision for
account oﬃcers. Corporate clients generally have a wide range of alternative sources of funding
as opposed to small business ﬁrms. The availability of credit is a non-binding dimension for the
account oﬃcer. Therefore, I use the pricing decision as my benchmark to analyze the impact on
the usage of soft information.
(ii) Pricing of Working Capital Loans (Core Lending), as this is the lending product which rela-
tionship managers can inﬂuence the most. The spread charged to the ﬁrm is under their command.
Although there is some scope for RMs to make use of qualitative information obtained about the
ﬁrms they handle, such procedure may not be easy to observe or quantify. Prices seem a good
alternative to do so. The room a relationship manager has for adjusting spreads charged diﬀers
greatly across products, as some products include fees and require transactions that go far beyond
the relationship manager’s range of authority. Three portfolio (lending) products are identiﬁed
within the bank; core lending, asset-based ﬁnance and trade ﬁnance. For the particular case of core
lending products, relationship managers experience more ﬂexibility in terms of pricing decisions as
34Mostly all references in the relationship lending literature correspond to the case of small-business lending prac-
tices. Among others. past empirical work include Petersen and Rajan [1994] and [1995] on pricing issues, Blackwell
and Winters [1994] and Cole [1998] on availability of credit and Petersen and Rajan [2001] on the role of distance.
36compared to the other two products. In Liberti [2002], I test for the cross-selling hypothesis for
the whole portfolio of the bank for the period 1999-2001 including both large and small business
lending. Table XII reproduces some of those results for large corporate clients. In Column (1) for
a $100,000 increase in non-lending revenues, the annual spread charged on core lending products
is reduced by 0.67%. This is not the case for Trade Finance or Asset-Based Finance products. All
speciﬁcations include year and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. In order to account for the incomplete panel of
ﬁrms, each regression is probability weighted according to the number of times each ﬁrms appears
in the sample. Results suggest that account managers have ﬂexibility in the way core lending
products are charged. There is no other Division or Department attached to this product other
than relationship managers. Therefore, I use the pricing of working capital loans to test for Stein’s
theory.
(iii) “Hardening” Soft Information. Although by deﬁnition soft information is diﬃcult to measure,
I use the word soft for that information which was initially not available in hard numbers (Petersen
[2002]). The organization quantiﬁes qualitative measures assigning a numerical score. Although
the hardening process, these qualitative evidence is costly and takes time and resources to collect. I
consider this qualitative evidence soft information as opposed to hard information which is costless
to obtain. Whether this process of quantifying soft implies losing information or not is beyond the
scope of the paper.
To measure the degree of reliance on soft informati o nIf o l l o wt h es a m es t r a t e g yu s e di ne q u a t i o n
(4) whereas now the dependent variable is the pricing of working capital loans and the coeﬃcient
of interest is the one associated with the variable (Zi ∗ Treatedi ∗ Postt). It analyzes the impact
that ﬁrms with an underlying soft or hard characteristic Zi, after the change, and handled by
either SBs or RMs switching regimes, have on the pricing of working capital loans. As qualitative
underlying characteristics I use Management, Competitive Position and Industry Risk Assessment,
where each one represents an average of a set of speciﬁc questions that evaluate the particular
measure. Hard characteristics include EBITDA-to-sales and ROE, among others, although only
these two are reported.35 Length of Relationship and Access to Capital Markets are included in the
analysis as control variables to capture the independent inﬂuence that each one has on the pricing
of working capital loans as a source of information (private and public) other than hard and soft
information (Petersen and Rajan [1994]). Results from running equation (4) are shown in Table
XIII for both hierarchical changes. Panel A shows the Introduction of Senior Banker Case while
Panel B exhibits the RMs Regime Switch.
35A value of 1 is assigned to a particular ﬁeld, either soft or hard, if the ﬁrm is in the top 50% of the distribution
on that category in the year prior to the change.
37Results suggest that information is used diﬀerently according to the degree of authority experi-
enced by the account oﬃcer who handles the account. In particular, such results corroborate that
authority inﬂuences the usage and reliance on soft information in pricing decisions.
Columns (1) to (3) measure the independent eﬀect of each of the soft measures on the pricing
of working capital loans for the SBs case. The eﬀect is negative and statistically signiﬁcant for the
three variables under consideration. Management Assessment exerts a higher negative impact on
the interest rate as compared to Competitive Position and Industry Assessment, on average negative
8.42%. Column (3) shows that the three variables aﬀect the spread through independent channels.
Columns (4) and (5) show the impact of EBITDA-to-Sales and ROE. Both hard variables have
a negative impact, although statistically signiﬁcant only for the ﬁrst one. The magnitude of the
impact is considerably smaller than the one found for the soft measures, on average a negative 2.56%.
Columns (7) to (10) test for the reliance on soft and hard variables simultaneously. Although the
direction of the impact is consistent with theoretical predictions for all variables under consideration,
soft variables are statistically signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations, and the magnitude of the impact on
pricing is sizeable as compared to hard measures. These results highlight the importance that
management and soft characteristics impose on relationship managers’ pricing decision. Although
not reported in the table, I also use as hard measures Sales-to-Assets, ROE, and Debt-to-Equity.
Results are qualitatively and quantitatively the same. Thereby, for ﬁrms handled by relationship
managers with full authority over their accounts, the pricing of working capital loans responds
to a higher extent to variables that denote soft relative to hard information. For the remaining
ﬁrms, held by account oﬃcers with partial authority, who still need to engage in direct reporting
to UHs, transmission of soft information is costly and such soft dependence is not observed on
pricing decisions. Columns (11) and (12) show such results. Hard measures are the ones that
are statistically signiﬁcant and exert a larger impact on the pricing decision as opposed to soft
variables in this case. Under all speciﬁcations, Access to Capital Markets is found to have a
negative impact on the pricing decision, between 2.71% and 3.68%, depending on the speciﬁcation
under consideration. Length of Relationship is not found to be statistically signiﬁcant and has a
mild eﬀect on the spread charged.
I performed several robustness checks and results are unchanged. (i) The spreads reported
on Table XIII include commissions and fees charged on working capital lines. Committed credit
facilities for working capital purposes may sometimes have a ﬁxed cost of usage.36 I also computed
36Credit facilities are divided into committed and uncommitted facilities. Committed facilities have attached a
ﬁxed fee or commission for the credit line approved to the client. It is generally a percentage of the total amount
approved to be paid up-front.
38the spreads using net revenues from funds without any fees or commissions charged. Results do
not diﬀer. (ii) I also used the spreads on the other two portfolio products, Asset-Based and Trade
Finance. Results are not statistically signiﬁcant and do not hold under these speciﬁcations. Such
ﬁndings are consistent with the underlying assumption that relationship managers only inﬂuence
the working capital loans, as opposed to products oﬀered by other divisions. (iii) I also checked
with hard underlying characteristics of year 2001 instead of year 1999. Results are qualitatively
unchanged.
As predicted by theory, usage of soft information is higher for ﬁrms held by oﬃcers with full
authority, as measured by their pricing decisions on working capital loans. Their greater incentives
in collecting such information emerges both from their lower cost of putting collected information
into use and from their direct authority over how to use such information. Relationship managers
who display only partial authority over their accounts must credibly convince their superiors about
the authenticity of the information, as well as dispute the process over the way such information
should be used. Thus, they face higher incentives to divert their research eﬀort to the collection
of hard information, which is easier to transmit. As a consequence, the pricing of working capital
loans is shown to rely more on variables that reﬂect soft information when the oﬃcer who holds
the account has full authority, and on variables that reﬂect hard information when authority of
the oﬃcer who holds the account is only partial. This suggests that the delegation of authority
increases managerial eﬀort, not only because management spends less time in reporting to their
superiors, but also because they recognize that their eﬀorts will have a greater impact on outcomes.
7 Is the Change in Structure Meaningful and Productive?
It was established in the preceding analysis that the change in structure had an impact on the
perceived eﬀort measures of both RMs and SBs and on the way it could impact the usage of soft
information. However, it is not clear whether the impact of the change is meaningful, as it is
diﬃcult to determine the magnitude and size of the change from the perspective of the bank using
only perceived eﬀo r tm e a s u r e s .T h ef a c tt h a ta c c o u n to ﬃcers were delegated more authority and
experienced additional time to spend with their clients does not necessarily mean that the change
in structure was productive to the bank. This section addresses this issue by considering: (i) if
RMs became more embedded in the ﬁrm in terms of acquiring a better understanding and a higher
knowledge of the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial needs and transactional banking services; and (ii) understanding
the welfare implications and impact of the change from the bank’s ﬁnancial performance ratios.
In order to assess whether the increase in perceived eﬀort can be supported as a consequence
39of productive interactions, I examine the degree of closeness between the ﬁrm and the bank. An
increase in time spent with the ﬁrms may be associated with activities other than learning about
the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial needs. Extended lunch hours or other related meetings may feed a relationship
on non productive grounds and still impact eﬀort measures positively. Therefore, the ultimate goal
of this section is to give a magnitude for the size of the change, which is not straightforward from
the perceived eﬀort measures analysis.
There are several reasons to believe that the change in the structure of the Corporate Bank
could have impacted the daily business of the ﬁrm-bank relationship and ultimately the bank’s
performance. Among others:
(i) Closeness of the Firm-Bank Relationship. It is not easy to determine which are the non-ﬁnancial
needs and transactional banking services that a ﬁrm requires from any commercial bank. It takes
time and commitment from the RM and the bank to establish a credible and close relationship
between both parties in order to understand the clients’ needs. Corporate lending occurs in an
environment where multiple products are traded, as opposed to small business lending. An oﬃcer
who is in line with the ﬁrm’s daily business and ﬁnancial needs will be able to oﬀer suitable products
and services. The fact that the change had an impact on the time RMs spend with their clients
induces a better knowledge of the ﬁrms’ requirements and may increase the cross-selling of services
per client.
(ii) Monitoring and Project Supervision. A closer relationship could impact the way monitoring
activities are performed. It is common practice in corporate lending that ﬁrms tend to deviate
short term working capital loans to other long term capital activities, i.e. ﬁnancing long-term
ﬁxed assets. Project supervision of speciﬁc investments that ﬁrms engage in and no incorrect use
of speciﬁc targeted credit facilities would be improved with an in-depth ﬁrm-bank relationship,
yielding a positive impact on the earnings-per-asset of the bank.
(iii) Risk Management Activities. Once a credit transaction has been approved, monitoring of risk
exposure is the ultimate goal of each account oﬃcer. By carefully monitoring individual credit
transactions, RMs can recognize trouble exposure at early stages of the credit life, giving her a
further array of possibilities for implementing remedial management techniques to minimize losses.
Either avoiding direct reporting for the case of SBs or minimizing bureaucratic overlapping of
activities and overruling as in the case of RMs increases the possibility that remedial management
is taken at earlier stages, thus aﬀecting overall proﬁtability for each account. The eﬃciency of the
RM in recognizing correct opportunities has a direct impact on the proﬁtability of the bank.
The empirical strategy follows the same procedure taken in equation (2). Using a diﬀerence-
40in-diﬀerence approach I test for the eﬀect that both full and partial delegation of authority have
on banks’ various performance measures as: (i) Cross-Selling Ratio; (ii) Proﬁtability Index; (iii)
Earnings-per-Asset and (iv) Number of Non-Lending Products. Table XIV, Panels A and B sum-
marize the results of running (2) on these four measures for the two cases of interest, Senior Bankers
and Relationship Managers.
To determine the impact of the change in terms of closeness between parties, as well as knowledge
of the ﬁrms’ speciﬁc needs, I use cross-selling measures I constructed from lending and non-lending
revenues. Revenues were taken from the Financial Control Division for each ﬁrm that was surveyed.
To compute total lending revenues I aggregated the portfolio products, i.e. Core Lending, Trade
Finance and Asset-Based Finance products each ﬁrms uses. To compute non-lending revenues I
considered the whole array of ﬁnancial services oﬀered by the bank - Trade Services, Asset and
Security Trading, Capital Markets Underwriting, Cash Management Services, Corporate Finance
and Structured Finance, Derivatives, Foreign Exchange, Funding and Gapping, Investment Asset
Management and Security Services (ADRs)-. As the relationship manager becomes closer to the
ﬁrm, the ratio of revenues obtained from non-lending relative to lending products will be higher.
Observing the cross-selling ratio is one attempt at getting to know how embedded the bank is in
the ﬁrm and it is the ﬁrst attempt to capture the magnitude of the organizational change in terms
of real bank’s performance. Column (1), Panels A and B, display the cross-selling results for SBs
and RMs respectively. The impact on the cross-selling is positive and signiﬁcant for the Senior
Banker case, and it is not statistically signiﬁcant for the RMs’ Regime Switch case. The magnitude
of the change is sizeable, with average increases of 16% and 14% respectively shown in Column
(2). In Column (3) I add ﬁrm controls -Long Term Maturity, Investment Grade Rating Firm,
Collateral/Clean Exposure and Length of Relationship-. Results for both cases are robust to this
speciﬁcation. An additional test to see the cross-selling impact is performed using the number of
non-lending products as a dependent variable. Column (8) shows that the impact on the number
of non-lending products is positive, although it is not statistically signiﬁcant. Results show that
for both organizational changes, cross-selling of ﬁnancial services increased as a result of the higher
knowledge of ﬁrms’ speciﬁc needs.
The main problem that arises in the analysis of cross-selling is related to the issue of delegating
authority. Cross-selling can be harmful if it is done at the expense of destroying earnings-per-asset.
It is possible that delegation of authority could have led account oﬃcers to charge less for lending
products in order to increase cross-selling since one of the goals account oﬃcers generally aim at
is increasing cross-selling ratios. Columns (4) to (7) in both panels check for this concern using as
dependent variables, earnings-per-asset (EPA) and a proﬁtability index. These variables are deﬁned
41as the ratio of all lending revenues including commissions and fees over average assets used by the
ﬁrm and total revenues over average assets used by the ﬁrm on an annual basis, respectively. Both
measures signiﬁcantly increased as a result of the change. As Table VII Panel B shows, the mean
of average assets that ﬁrms use does not change across years. The result on EPA is a pure price
eﬀect reﬂecting an increase on spreads charged to ﬁrms, possibly due to the deteriorating economic
situation of the country and not to a decrease in the exposure that corporate clients have with
the bank. Results suggest that the change had a strong impact on those ﬁrms handled by Senior
Bankers (EPA increased 2.7%) and a mild one for those ﬁr m sh a n d l e db yR M s( 0 . 6 % ) ,w h i c hi s
not statistically signiﬁcant. Results also show that cross-selling has not increased as a consequence
of a negative impact on the interest rates charged to ﬁrms. The overall performance of ﬁrms from
the bank’s ﬁnancial perspective is analyzed by looking at the proﬁtability index in Columns (6)-
(7). Results are consistent with both the increase in cross-selling activities and earnings-per-asset,
allowing for the conclusion that the hierarchical structure change and delegation of authority to
SBs/RMs was not harmful to the ﬁnancial structure of the bank.
As account oﬃcers are given more freedom to allocate their time and eﬀort across accounts, an
increase in cross-selling activities is observed. It is shown that the previously documented increase
in perceived eﬀort is legitimately associated with an increase in the closeness between the ﬁrm and
the bank and therefore the change is found to be both meaningful and productive from the bank’s
perspective.
8C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper empirically attempts to understand how a change in the hierarchical structure of a
large organization aﬀects the way employees carry out their activities, and its impact on their daily
business performance. The speciﬁc setting used for analysis is a large, private foreign commercial
bank in Argentina. The paper also exploits such a setting to link the impact of the organizational
change to the ﬁrm-bank relationship lending literature.
From the organizational design standpoint, to the best of my knowledge, it is the ﬁrst attempt
to test for an incentive view of delegation along the lines of Aghion & Tirole [1997], exploiting
the reasons why decentralization may induce higher eﬀort relative to centralization of control. I
construct a test for the role of incentives in allocation of eﬀort versus traditional monitoring theory.
The paper shows empirically how a change in the hierarchical structure of a large organization
can impact incentives of the lower layers of the hierarchy by inducing higher eﬀort as a direct
consequence of higher authority. I use eﬀort measures taken from quality surveys done annually
42t oar a n d o ms e to fﬁrms and ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics taken from credit folder approvals. The
analysis is performed at both the individual relationship manager level and at the ﬁrm level. The
identiﬁcation strategy is based on using a subset of account oﬃcers which were not aﬀected by
the organizational change. I ﬁnd strong empirical evidence that both full and partial delegation of
authority induces higher eﬀort exertion, as measured by the time relationship managers devote to
their corporate clients, as well as in terms of the number of complaints received by the bank. At
the RM level, the total number of complaints decreased after the hierarchical change and a subset
of those complaints, time complaints, which also decreased, was also used to check for robustness
of the results. At the ﬁrm level, the positive impact found on eﬀort is shown to be robust to the
inclusion of a variety of ﬁrm characteristics.
I particularly address selection issues at both the RM level - ‘special’ account oﬃcers in 1-1
relationships in 1999 and ‘special’ account oﬃcers promoted to Senior Bankers- and at the ﬁrm
level - ‘special’ ﬁrms given to Senior Bankers. By analyzing possible confounding stories and alter-
native explanations through which perceived eﬀort measures could have increased other than the
hierarchical change, I conclude that diﬀerences in pre-existing characteristics are not driving the re-
sults. Furthermore, the paper sheds light on a small but growing line of research, the large-business
lending relationships. I point out some of the mechanisms through which banks may inﬂuence
corporate ﬁrms in terms of monitoring activities. Internal credit rules within the bank as changes
in collateral or increase in total facilities, other than more traditional monitoring stories such as
bargaining position of the ﬁrm vis-à-vis the bank and proﬁtability, appear to have a diﬀerential
impact on the eﬀort that relationship managers exert on the accounts they handle.
Despite these other alternative monitoring determinants, the direct eﬀect of the hierarchical
change on eﬀort does not disappear, implying that the change had an eﬀective impact on the
incentives of account oﬃcers.
Results suggest that the organizational structure of an institution has a strong inﬂuence on the
way activities are performed and how resources are allocated throughout the diﬀerent divisions.
The paper is the ﬁrst contribution on these grounds.
Of course the increase in eﬀort could be because there was a reduction in the layers of bu-
reaucracy giving account managers additional time. I test whether the improvement is because
managers make better use of their decision making authority. The paper contributes to the infor-
mation production and the use of soft information literature by providing a direct test. Exploring
the diﬀerences in degrees of authority and team sizes, I construct a test for Stein [2002] and provide
empirical evidence for the role and usage of soft relative to hard information on certain decisions
relationship managers are responsible for. Results are consistent with predictions from the theory.
43This suggests that delegation of authority increases managerial eﬀort not only because manage-
ment spends less time reporting to bosses, but also because they recognize that their eﬀorts have
an impact on the usage of soft information.
As the transmission costs of soft information diﬀer among team sizes, reliance on qualitative
evidence in pricing decisions is found to be higher for those account oﬃcers with full delegation of
authority. Separation of authority and research adversely aﬀect both the incentives and the ability
to gather and use the collected soft information. This induces higher usage of hard relative to soft
for account oﬃcers in larger team sizes who experience only partial authority over ﬁnal decisions.
Pricing relies more heavily on hard measures for such oﬃcers.
As it is diﬃcult to quantify the impact of the hierarchical change solely from perceived eﬀort
measures, the last step is to analyze the welfare implications of the change from the bank’s perspec-
tive. An in-depth knowledge of the ﬁrms’ needs and a closer ﬁrm-bank relationship made it possible
for cross-selling activities to increase. Furthermore, earnings-per-asset were not harmed for such
increase, which leads to the conclusion that the change in structure was meaningful and productive
for the bank. These results conﬁrm the importance and the role that relationship managers have
in large-business lending.
This paper has taken a ﬁr s ts t e pt o w a r d st e s t i n ga ni n c e n t i v ev i e wo fd e l e g a t i o nt h e o r yb ya n a -
lyzing the hierarchical structure of a large organization and understanding the impact of diﬀerential
authority among its employees. The paper conﬁrms the view that organizational structure does
play a role on ﬁnal outcomes and decisions, in this case corporate lending relationships. Further
research on other type of organizational structures and activities would improve the understanding
of its inﬂuence on individual behavior.
44AD a t a A p p e n d i x
The purpose of this data appendix is to provide a description and a precise deﬁnition of all the
variables used in the empirical analysis of the paper. The data used in this paper is a subset of the
data I collected between the months of July and December of 2001 from the private commercial
bank in Argentina. The data can be classiﬁed into 4 main groups:
1. Quality Survey Perceived Eﬀort Measures Data;
2. Individual, Portfolio and Letters of Complaints Relationship Managers Data;
3. Firm Soft and Hard Variables Data;
4. Firm Products and Revenue Data.
A.1 Quality Measures
Quality Measures were obtained from the Quality Team Division. On an annual basis an inde-
pendent third-party ﬁrm is hired by the bank to perform quality surveys. Surveys are targeted to
evaluate the role of relationship managers in analyzing the status of the ﬁrm-bank relationship.
The surveys include questions about the overall performance of the bank, degree of involvement
of other sectors and the satisfaction with the attention corporate clients receive as a whole. Each
question is answered using a 1-7 rank that reﬂects an increasing degree of satisfaction. Regarding
the speciﬁc questions related to the relationship managers, I used the following selected questions
when constructing the perceived eﬀort measures:
[EﬀortA
i ]: Time the RM devotes to the relationship and ability to communicate and access her/him.
[EﬀortB
i ]: Attitude of the RM towards managing the account.
[EﬀortC
i ]: Knowledge of the relationship and ﬁrm’s needs regarding ﬁnancial and transactional
banking services.
[EﬀortD
i ]: Solutions proposed and provided by the RM.
[EﬀortE
i ]: Speed and eﬃciency of RM’s response to the ﬁrm’s requests.
[EﬀortF
i ]: Eﬃcient coordination of the sectors involved in providing solutions.
[EﬀortG
i ]: General satisfaction with the RM in handling the relationship.
[Aggregatei]: Average RM performance according to other measures that speciﬁcally relate to the
role of the RM in managing the account including measures A, B, C & E.
45A.2 Relationship Manager Measures
Individual account oﬃcers variables are classiﬁed according to (i) personal data, (ii) total portfolio
composition of each account oﬃcer and (iii) qualitative evidence produced by letters of complaints
from corporate clients. The sources from where these variables were obtained vary within the bank.
A detailed description is provided as follows.
1. Personal Data. I asked 4 speciﬁc questions to each relationship manager/senior banker in the
Corporate Bank. For those present in 1999 and not in 2001, I cross-checked the information required
with the Human Resources Division. The variables asked and used in the RM level analysis include:
[Age]:I ny e a r s .
[Gender]:M a l e / F e m a l e
[Experience]: Measured in months, period since the individual became staﬀ of the bank.
[Compensation]: Did your compensation scheme change as a consequence of the hierarchical
structure change?
2. Portfolio Composition Data. The source of this data is the Credit Administration Unit of the
bank. For each account oﬃcer for both years 1999 and 2001, I aggregated all the ﬁrms they managed
at each point in time and computed the total portfolio composition under their responsibility.
Attributes of the portfolio are considered. I also took some bank characteristics for each account
oﬃcer in terms of the industry they were concentrating at that time. Variables include:
[Number of Accounts]: Total number of accounts with credit exposure that each RM handles.
[Business/Industry Unit]: Each Business Unit is classiﬁed according to a speciﬁc industry. Also,
each client is assigned a speciﬁc 4 digit-SIC according to the industry and business they belong to.
An alternative measure I used in the regressions for the Business/Industry Unit is the one-digit
SIC code.
[Size of Unit]: Total number of account oﬃcers in a Business Unit.
[Total Loan Portfolio Outstanding]: Total loan portfolio exposure and committed facilities
aggregated across all ﬁrms that each RM handles.
[Total Credit Facilities Approved]: Total credit facilities approved aggregated by all ﬁrms per
RM. This is the total amount approved per ﬁrm and does not necessarily reﬂect the exposure with
the ﬁrm under consideration.
[Cross-Border Risk-Approval]: Accounts for the share of total loan portfolio per RM which is
approved outside the local branch of the bank. Any credit facility approval is composed by two
46risks: commercial and country risk. Commercial risk is the risk that ﬁnancial obligations to the
bank will not be paid on time. It is a customer-related risk, as the dimension of the risk depends
on the customer’s willingness and ability to fulﬁll all the obligations with the bank. Country Risk
is a broad risk including political, convertibility and transfer risks. Cross-Border Approval refers
t ot h a ts i t u a t i o ni nw h i c hs o m ef o r e i g nb r a n c ho u t side Argentina approves the Commercial Risk of
the ﬁrm under consideration.
[Credit Classiﬁcation Type I]: Current. No evident weakness. Accrual Assets.
[Credit Classiﬁcation Type II]: Issues Raised on the Client. Credits show evidence of weakness
in borrower’s ﬁnancial condition or credit worthiness. Credits may be subject to non-credible
repayment schedule, lacking correct collateral, credit information or the documentation is not
correctly signed. Assets are on-accrual basis.
[Credit Classiﬁcation Type III]: Substandard. Normal repayment of principal and interest may
be or has been jeopardized. No loss is yet foreseen. Non-Accrual Assets is a possible scenario.
[Credit Classiﬁcation Type IV]: Doubtful. Full payment appears questionable on basis of
current information. Certain degree of loss is possible under this circumstance. Non-Accrual
Assets.
3. Letters of Complaints. From the Customer Service Division I manually counted the number of
letters of complaints that the bank received from its corporate clients and that are related to the
role of relationship managers. I counted both letters of complaints and bad comments for the years
1999 and 2001.
[Complaint]:Number of Letters of Complaints aggregated at the RM level.
[Time]:Dummy variable that assigns a value of 1 if at least one of those letters of complaints
speciﬁcally refers to the impossibility to communicate and access the RM.
[Bureaucratic]:Dummy variable that assigns a value of 1 if at least one of those letters of com-
plaints speciﬁcally refers to the slow speed of the RM in answering clients’ concerns.
47A.3 Firm Level Measures
I manually collected ﬁrm level data from credit folders facilities approvals. I used a subset of the
data I collected at the ﬁrm level by matching those companies that were surveyed with information
from their credit ﬁles. Firm level data includes both hard and soft measures, as well as internal
bank criteria regarding the way credit facilities are approved. I classify these measures according
to: (i) hard quantitative variables; (ii) business risk assessment soft variables and (iii) internal bank
criteria variables.
1. Hard Quantitative Variables
[Average Assets]: In $ million. Mean exposure on annual basis that the ﬁrm has with the bank.
[Foreign Ownership]: Dummy variable that assigns a value of 1 if the ownership of the ﬁrm is
foreign as compared to top tier local companies.
[Global Relationship Banking Company]: Dummy variable that assigns a value of 1 if the
ﬁrm belongs to a Global Relationship Banking Company.
[Length of Relationship]: Measured in months. This variable assigns a value of 1 if the length
of the relationship of the underlying ﬁrm is on the top 50% of the distribution of the sampled ﬁrms.
[Years in Industry]: Measured in months. This variable assigns a value of 1 if years in industry
of the underlying ﬁrm is on the top 50% of the distribution of the sampled ﬁrms.
[Maturity > 3 Years - Covenants]: Dummy variable that assigns a value of 1 if the credit
approval under analysis has a long-term maturity special transaction approved. Covenants for
transactions above or equal to 3 years are generally non-standard, including both quantitative and
qualitative measures the RMs needs to follow-up and check on their status.
[Investment Grade Rating Firm]: Credit Ratings are assigned to customers on a scale of 1 to
10, and are based on a debt rating model from the ﬁnancial statements of the ﬁrm. Such ratings
are deﬁned in terms of loss norms. The best rating is a 1, which generally corresponds to a “AAA”
investment grade on the Standard’s & Poor rating scale. A risk rating of 10 generally corresponds
to Standard & Poor’s “D” rating and indicates that a customer or facility is “doubtful” or a “loss”.
Ratings of 1 to 4 are regarded as investment-grade ratings, while 5 to 10 are non-investment grade
ratings. This dummy variable assigns a value of 1 if the ﬁrm has an obligor risk rating of 4 or less.
[>50% Clean Exposure]: Dummy variable that assigns a value of 1 if more than 50% of the
credit exposure of the ﬁrm with the bank does not present any collateral.
Iu s e dﬁnancial statements of each company to create some measures covering the operating,
liquidity and debt position of the ﬁrm. All ﬁnancial variables are compared to the distribution
48of the sampled ﬁrms. Each of them corresponds to a dummy variable that assigns a value of 1 if
the ﬁrm is on the top 50% of the distribution for the underlying characteristic of interest. The
deﬁnitions of these variables are:
[Current Ratio]: Liquidity Measure. Ratio of Current Assets over Current Liabilities.
[Leverage]: Debt Measure. Ratio of Total Liabilities over Net Worth and Minority Interest.
[Debt-to-Equity]: Debt Measure. Ratio of Short and Long Term Debt over opening Net Worth.
[Return-on-Assets]: Operating Measure. ROA is the ratio of Net Income over opening Total
Assets.
[Return-on-Equity]: Operating Measure. ROE is the ratio of Net Income over opening Net
Worth.
[Sales-to-Assets]: Operating Measure. Ratio of Net Sales over Total Assets.
[EBITDA-to-Sales]: Operating Measure. Ratio of EBITDA (Earning Before Income Tax and
Depreciation) to Sales. At year t, I also used as the one-year forecast (EBITDA-to-Sales) in t +1 .
2. Soft Measures - Business Risk Assessment Variables
These soft measures represent averages of a set of speciﬁc questions and topics that evaluate
each particular ﬁeld. A value of 1 is assigned to the ﬁeld if the ﬁrm is in the top 50% of the
distribution on that category in the year prior to the change, 1999. Each topic is ranked between
1-7, where 1 corresponds to the best grade possible. Both ﬁelds and topics that are covered in each
one are described as follows:
[Management Risk Assessment]: Includes Professionalism, Systems and Controls, Financial
Disclosure and Ability to Act Decisively.
[Management Ability to Act Decisively]: Subset of the previous general ﬁeld.
[Competitive Position Risk Assessment]: Includes Market Position, Product Line Diversity,
Operating Cost Advantage, Technology Advantage, and Capability to Face External Risks.
[Key Success Factors]: Each industry faces diﬀerent Key Success Factors to become a competi-
tive player in the market and industry under consideration. Key Success Factors for each industry
are crucial in identifying customers that oﬀer an acceptable level of risk with a high potential
return.
[Industry Risk Assessment]: Includes Trend in Output, Trend in Earnings, Cyclically (Fluctu-
ations) and External Risks.
[Risk Management Policies]: Includes Leverage, Liquidity and Hedging Policies.
49[Access to Capital Markets]: Separate ﬁeld including the degree of access to local and interna-
tional capital markets.
[Other Bank Relations]: Separate ﬁeld analyzing other established bank relationships and the
degree of commitment that exists in those bank relationships.
3. Internal Bank Criteria Variables
These variables correspond to “YES/NO” questions the account oﬃcer must answer. They are
generally the cover page of any credit facility approval. A value of 1 is assigned to the underlying
characteristic if a “YES” answer is documented.
[Target Market Exception]: If the ﬁrm under analysis does not belong to an identiﬁed segment
of the industry and customer base.
[Risk Acceptance Exceptions]: A set of characteristics used to deﬁne the type of risk the bank
is willing to assume for each industry.
[Downgrade in Risk Rating]: Since last full credit review, the ﬁrm experienced 2 or more
sub-grades downgrades.
[Signiﬁcant Increase in Total Credit Facilities]: Subjective decision on the increase in total
credit facilities.
[Major Risk Event at the Company]: Any risk event at the company that may put in jeopardy
the ﬁrm-bank relation, including adverse changes in management.
[Signiﬁcant Adverse Change in KSFs, Obligor Risks or Mitigant]: This variable captures
any change in the critical success factors of the ﬁrm, risks or changes in the way-outs of the relation.
[Signiﬁcant Adverse Change in Collateral/Support]: Includes changes in the collateral,
support from shareholders and/or holding company and documentation risk. Documentation risk
is the risk that the documentary evidence (contracts) of a transaction are incorrect or cannot be
enforced.
50A.4 Products and Revenue Measures
From the Financial Control Division of the bank I collected both lending and non-lending products
revenue data for each ﬁrm for both years 1999 and 2001.
[Cross-Selling]: Continuous variable between 0 and 1. It is the ratio of Non-Lending Revenues
over Total Revenues on an annual basis. Lending Products include Core Lending Finance, Trade
Finance and Asset Based Finance. Non-Lending Products are classiﬁed in Trade Services, Asset
and Security Trading, Capital Markets Underwriting, Cash Management Services (Local and In-
ternational), Corporate Finance and Structured Finance, Derivatives, Foreign Exchange, Funding
and Gapping, Investment Asset Management and Security Services (ADRs).
[Pricing Lending Producti]:Is the ratio of annual net revenues from funds (including commis-
sions and fees) over average assets on the i − th product used by the ﬁrm under consideration.
T h es p r e a di sc a l c u l a t e do nt h et h r e ep o r t f o l i op r oducts. An alternative measure also used in the
analysis excludes the commissions and fees.
[EPA]: Earnings-per-assets is the ratio of all lending revenues over average assets on annual basis.
[TR/Assets]: The proﬁtability index is the ratio of total revenues over average assets on annual
basis.
[Number of Non-Lending Products]: Discrete variable between 0 and 10 including the whole
aggregated array of non-lending products.
[NL Revenues/Bank Assets per Producti]: Total non-lending revenues normalized by the
total assets the bank has on each of its i lending products.
[NL Revenues/Total Bank Portfolio]:Total non-lending revenues normalized by the total port-
folio of assets the bank has.
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56Table I 
Relationship Manager Level Analysis 
Difference-in-Difference Unconditional Analysis 
Selected Average Perceived Effort Measures – Senior Banker and Hierarchical Regime Switch 
 
This table presents results from the difference-in-difference unconditional analysis before and after the organizational structure change took place at the aggregate level for the treated and control group. The variables reported 
are selected average perceived effort measures for both changes. Panel A reports the full delegation of authority case, or Introduction of Senior Banker, while Panel B reports the partial delegation Hierarchical Regime Switch. 
The average effort measures come from annual quality surveys performed independently by a private consulting company hired by the bank. Surveys take place between September and November of each year and the 
participating firms are randomly selected. Questions on the survey make specific reference to the firm-bank relationship, with special attention to the role played by the Relationship Manager in handling the account and the 
knowledge she has about the firm’s financial needs, the attitude and speed of response to the firm’s requirements and the and expertise of the RM, among other related issues. The measure Aggregate Average Performance of 
RM* is constructed using those perceived effort measures which specifically relate to the role of the RM in handling the account. The variable Total Number of Complaints is the total number of letters of complaints received 
by the bank from its clients about the relationship and the poor attention received from the relationship manager.  These letters were manually collected and counted from the Customer Service Division. The Control Group in 
both panels refers to the Business Unit which was not affected by the change in hierarchical structure. The Treated Group corresponds, separately, to each of the groups that were affected by the change. 
 
A. Introduction of Senior Banker
Characteristics
1999 2001 Difference 1999 2001 Difference 1999 2001 Difference 1999 2001 Difference 1999 2001 Difference 1999 2001 Difference 1999 2001 Difference
By Senior Banker
Control Group 5.8351 5.7224 -0.1127 5.7279 5.6224 -0.1055 6.1333 5.9607 -0.1726 5.6438 5.5839 -0.0599 5.7717 5.2859 -0.4858 5.8673 5.6029 -0.2644 3.2 5.0 1.8
Treated Group 6.1641 6.3294 0.1653 6.0939 6.4495 0.3556 6.3426 6.3525 0.0099 6.0559 6.1863 0.1304 5.9686 5.7833 -0.1853 6.1161 6.0568 -0.0593 1.5 0.8 -0.7
Dif-in-Dif 0.3290 0.6070 0.2780 0.3660 0.8271 0.4611 0.2093 0.3918 0.1825 0.4121 0.6024 0.1903 0.1969 0.4974 0.3005 0.2488 0.4539 0.2051 -1.7 -4.2 -2.5
Percentage Change 3.97% 6.59% 2.61%   2.72% 4.29% 2.93%
B. Hierarchical Regime Switch
Characteristics
1999 2001 Difference 1999 2001 Difference 1999 2001 Difference 1999 2001 Difference 1999 2001 Difference 1999 2001 Difference 1999 2001 Difference
By RM
Control Group 5.8351 5.7224 -0.1127 5.7279 5.6224 -0.1055 6.1333 5.9607 -0.1726 5.6438 5.5839 -0.0599 5.7717 5.2859 -0.4858 5.8673 5.6029 -0.2644 3.2 5.0 1.8
Treated Group 6.0265 6.2740 0.2475 5.9255 6.4464 0.5209 6.2147 6.4166 0.2019 5.9392 5.9648 0.0256 5.9479 5.9607 0.0128 5.6187 6.1994 0.5807 2.3 0.8 -1.5
Dif-in-Dif 0.1914 0.5516 0.3602 0.1976 0.8240 0.6264 0.0814 0.4559 0.3745 0.2954 0.3809 0.0855 0.1762 0.6748 0.4986 -0.2486 0.5965 0.8451 -1.0 -4.3 -3.3
Percentage Change 5.15% 8.95% 5.35%   1.22% 7.12% 12.07%
Aggregate Average 
Performance of RM*
Time for Account & Ability 
to Communicate
Attitude and Responsibility of 
the RM towards the Account 
Knowledge of the 
Relationship and Firm's needs
Knowledge and Experience of 
RM in providing Solutions 
Total Number of 
Complaints




Time for Account & Ability 
to Communicate
Attitude and Responsibility of 
the RM towards the Account 
Knowledge of the 
Relationship and Firm's needs 
Knowledge and Experience of 
RM in providing Solutions 
Total Number of 
Complaints
Speed of RM Response to 
Requests
 Table II 
Relationship Manager Level Analysis 
Selection, Comparability of Samples and Validity of Control Group 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table analyses the comparability of samples and the validity of the control group at the RM aggregate level data. Panel A                        
-Selection and Comparability of Samples - compares the means of selected statistics across the treated samples of interest – Senior Bankers 
and Relationship Managers – for each year. This panel evaluates possible selection issues in terms of the individuals who were promoted to 
Senior Bankers as well as selection of individuals assigned to different team sizes in 1999.  Panel B tests for the validity of the Control 
Group. It compares the means of selected statistics for each treated sample of interest to the Control Group, in each year, to evaluate the 
adequacy of it. The Control Group is the Global Relationship Banking Unit (GRB).  In Panel A for 1999, SBs stands for those individuals 
that became SBs in 2001.  Thus in 1999, SBs is a subset of the RMs group. The same occurs in Panel B for 1999. In the Team Assignment 
Case of 1999 and in 2001 all groups are mutually exclusive. The variable Cross-Border Risk Approval accounts for the share of the total 
loan portfolio that each RM handles that is approved outside the local branch of the bank. The variables % of Portfolio Type I, II and III 
represent the internal bank credit classification system: current, issues raised on the client and substandard, respectively. In Panel A:  *, ** 
and *** denote significant differences from the sample of all RMs in each year at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively using a Mann-
Whitney test for equality of distributions. In Panel B:  *, ** and *** denote significant differences from the Control Group sample in each 
year at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively using a Mann-Whitney test for the equality of distributions. 
 
Panel A - Selection and Comparability of Samples
 
RM Level Variables SBs RMs SBs RMs RMs Single RM
Age 34.6*** 31.9 36.6*** 33.0 31.9 32.8
Experience in the Bank 7.29** 6.21 9.29** 7.3 6.21 7.61*
Number of Accounts 24.1 24.2 20.9 19.9 24.2 27.5
Cross-Border Risk Approval 0.29 0.36 0.25 0.34 0.36 0.20**
% Portfolio Type I 0.85 0.91 0.76 0.79 0.91 0.84
% Portfolio Type II 0.14 0.08 0.18 0.18 0.08 0.14*
 
% Portfolio Type III 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.01 0.02*
Number of Observations 9 21 9 10 21 7
Panel B - Validity of Control - Tests of Equality of Samples
RM Level Variables SBs RMs Control SBs RMs Control
Age 34.6* 31.9 30.5 36.6** 33.0 32.2
Experience in the Bank 7.29 6.21 6.58 9.29 7.30 7.65
Number of Accounts 24.1 24.2 27.0 20.9 19.9 24.0
Cross-Border Risk Approval 0.29** 0.36* 0.57 0.25** 0.34* 0.47
% Portfolio Type I 0.85 0.91 0.95 0.76 0.79 0.94
% Portfolio Type II 0.14 0.08 0.04 0.18 0.18 0.05
 
% Portfolio Type III 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.02
Number of Observations 9 21 5 9 10 5
1999 2001




Notes: Though not reported due to a Confidentiality Agreement, Total Portfolio Outstanding for each relationship manager was computed. 
For both Panels A and B, Total Portfolio is statistically different at 5% significant level for the Senior Bankers treated group.Table III 
Relationship Manager Level Analysis 
Before-After Estimation Senior Bankers Case – Robustness Check using Letters of Complaints 
it i it e ε δ θ γ α + + + + = t Post     it x  
 
This table presents results from OLS regressions for the before-after estimation for the Senior Bankers Case, for the change in hierarchical structure that took place between 1999 and 
2001. The unit of observation is the relationship manager (RM). The dependent variable is the average perceived effort of the RM across all surveyed firms denoted by  Effort
A.  
Except for Column (2), where I report the aggregate effort measure, columns (1) to (6) report the effort measure that relates to the time the RM devotes to the account and the ability 
to communicate and access her. Column (7) uses the number of Letters of Complaints received by the Customer Service Division as a dependent variable. Columns (8) use a subset of 
these letters of complaints. The dummy variable Time Complaint takes a value of 1 if a Letter of Complaint refers to impossibility of contacting the RM in any way. Personal 
Controls include Age, Experience in the bank and Gender. The variable Size of Unit accounts for possible peer pressure effects and free-riding issues within the business units. 
Although not reported in this Table, Total Portfolio Outstanding by each RM was also used instead of Number of Accounts in the regressions.  The variable % of Cross-Border 
Approval accounts for the share of the total loan portfolio that each RM handles that is approved outside the local branch of the bank. The variables % of Portfolio Type I, II and III 
represent the internal bank credit classification system: current, issues raised on the client and substandard, respectively. Single Hierarchy 1999 is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the account officer under analysis was working under a 1-1 hierarchical relationship in 1999.  Robust standard errors clustered at the Individual SB level are reported in 
parenthesis.  *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. 
 








Postt 0.6059** 0.4978** 0.6255** 0.5888*** 0.4933** 0.4830* -2.0268*** -2.6206*
(0.3057) (0.2837) (0.2287) (0.1538) (0.2072) (0.2458) (0.5141) (1.4731)
Size of Unit 0.1187 -0.0470 -0.0682 0.3284** 0.5467*
(0.1326) (0.1097) (0.1375) (0.1435) (0.3545)
Number of Accounts -0.0100 -0.0025 -0.0018 0.0388** 0.0860*
(0.0071) (0.0033) (0.0030) (0.0162) (0.0521)
Single Hierarchy 1999 0.5676** 0.6445** 0.6163** 0.9173*** -1.3021 -2.3458*
(0.2608) (0.2677) (0.2157) (0.2187) (1.0411) (1.6734)
% Cross-Border Approval -1.2373*** -1.1615**
(0.2823) (0.3446)
Personal Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes
Pre-Change Mean 5.7977*** 5.8174*** 5.3744*** 5.9210*** 6.9863*** 6.6094*** 2.9349 1.4780
for Senior Bankers (0.2534) (0.2410) (0.2895) (0.8203) (0.6433) (0.4006) (1.7521) (1.0712)
   
R-Squared 0.14 0.15 0.28 0.41 0.73 0.75 0.69 0.50




1. Regression includes controls for the share of the total loan portfolio held by the RM in Type I, II and III classifications.  Coefficients  on these variables are not reported. Results 
show that Type I Portfolio Classification is negative but not statistically significant and Type II is positive and statistically significant at 10%. Both classifications are expressed with 
respect to Type III Portfolio Classifications. The coefficients of both Type I and II are -0.0659 and 1.6975 respectively. Table IV 
Relationship Manager Level Analysis 
Before-After Estimation RMs Regime Switch   
it i it e ε δ θ γ α + + + + = t Post     it x  
 
This table presents results from OLS and PROBIT regressions aimed at testing centralization against decentralization of authority for 
the RMs Regime Switch. Using a before-after estimation strategy, I test for the role of initiative in the new team assignment.  The unit 
of observation is the relationship manager (RM). Except for Columns (5) and (6), the dependent variable is the average perceived 
effort of the RM across all surveyed firms. The effort measure used as dependent variable is the time the RM spends and devotes to 
the relationship. In Columns (5) and (6) the dependent variable is the Number of Letters of Complaints and the Time Complaint 
dummy respectively.  In this case of the Hierarchical Regime Switch, Size of Unit is not used as a control variable since I am testing 
for differential effort across the number of members in different business units. Personal Controls include Age, Experience in the 
Bank and Gender. Industry fixed effects in this particular case are not added since they are correlated with the number of team 
members per business unit. Robust standard errors clustered at the Individual RM level are reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** 
denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. 
 
Probit







Postt 0.4074* 0.4019* 0.4171** 0.4958* -1.8432*** -1.6251*
(0.2060) (0.2070) (0.1988) (0.2802) (0.5339) (0.9461)
Single Hierarchy 1999 0.2798 -1.8470** -0.6371
(0.4236) (0.6888) (1.0253)
Number of Accounts -0.0041 -0.0011 -0.0019 0.0081 0.0237
(0.0062) (0.0049) (0.0043) (0.0109) (0.0227)
% Cross-Border Approval -0.6311** -0.6985**  
(0.3083) (0.3524)  
Personal Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-Change Mean 6.033*** 6.0976*** 6.1322*** 5.9566*** 0.4620 -0.6221
for Single RMs (0.1380) (0.8661) (0.7514) (0.6316) (1.2656) (2.6322)
 
R-Squared 0.14 0.20 0.38 0.39 0.79 0.37
Number Observations 31 31 31 31 22 22
OLS Estimates





1. Regression includes controls for the share of the total loan portfolio held by the RM in Type I, II and III classifications. Both 
classifications are expressed with respect to Type III Portfolio Classifications. Coefficients on these variables are not reported. Results 
show that Type I Portfolio Classification is positive in both columns but not statistically significant in either of both. Type II is also 
positive and not significant. In both cases, the coefficient on Type II is higher than the one on Type I classification. Table V 
Relationship Manager Level Analysis 
Difference-in-Difference Estimation - Senior Bankers  
it t i t i i it e ε θ β δ γ γ α + + + + + + = it x   ) Post * Treated ( Post   Treated 0  
 
This table presents results from OLS and PROBIT regressions for the difference-in-difference estimation of the Senior Bankers Case, for the change in the organizational structure that 
took place between 1999 and 2001. The unit of observation is the relationship manager (RM). Under all specifications, other environmental changes that may have taken place during the 
period are taken into account by the use of a control group. This control group is a Business Unit which did not change either its hierarchical structure changed or the definition of tasks 
within the unit. In Columns (1) to (6), the dependent variable is the average perceived effort measure. In Column (7) the dependent variable is the total annual number of complaints 
directed to each RM received by the Customer Service Division and in Column (8) the dependent variable is the Time Complaint dummy. Columns (1) to (7) exhibit OLS estimates while 
Column (8) exhibit PROBIT estimates. Personal Controls include Gender, Age and Experience in the bank. Bank RM Controls include Number of Accounts, Cross-Border Portfolio 
Approval and Size of Unit. Pre-existing differences for Senior Bankers is a dummy that assigns the value of 1 in both years to all individuals who became Senior Bankers in 2001. This 
variable captures the pre-existing differences related to the individuals who became Senior Bankers.  If this group of individuals is a special group, this dummy tries to capture the 
“Promotion Selection” effect. Therefore, the interaction term captures the causal effect of the change. Robust standard errors clustered at the Individual SB level are reported in parenthesis.  
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. 








Treatedi*Postt 0.3722** 0.4922*** 0.4671* 0.4595** 0.3942* 0.4813*** -1.0694* -1.1808*
(0.1582) (0.1626) (0.2511) (0.2222) (0.2301) (0.2047) (0.6131) (0.6927)
Postt 0.2044 0.2289 0.0981 0.1468 0.1447 0.1513 -0.3862 -0.3686
(0.1792) (0.1863) (0.1990) (0.2034) (0.2078) (0.1976) (0.9452) (0.8230)
Single Hierarchy 1999 0.4163* 0.3407 0.3497* -0.5140 -0.1904
(0.2332) (0.2423) (0.2067) (1.1576) (0.9402)
Personal  Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes





Industry Fixed Effects Yes
R-Squared 0.12 0.16 0.29 0.41 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.44
Number Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 44 44
Pre-existing differences  0.1644 0.1167 -0.2117 -0.3293** -0.3448** -0.3540** 0.8386 0.7941
for SB - Treatedi (0.2572) (0.2249) (0.2711) (0.1531) (0.1350) (0.1416) (0.6022) (0.6222)




1. Cross-Border Portfolio Approval is negative and statistically significant at 5%.  
2. Regression also includes as control variables –not reported- Portfolio Type Classifications.  Results show that Type I and II Portfolio Classification are negative and positive 
respectively, though not statistically significant. Both classifications are expressed with respect to Type III Portfolio Classifications. The coefficients of both Type I and II are -0.0729 and 
0.4443 respectively. 
3. Number of Accounts is replaced by Total Portfolio Outstanding while using as control variables Cross-Border Portfolio and Size of Unit. The control variables Cross-Border Portfolio 
and Total Portfolio Outstanding are negatively statistically significant at 5% and 10% respectively.  
4. Size of Unit is positive and statistically significant at 5%.Table VI 
Relationship Manager Level Analysis  
Difference-in-Difference Estimation – RMs’ Regime Switch   
it t i t i i it e ε θ β δ γ γ α + + + + + + = it x   ) Post * Treated ( Post   Treated 0  
 
This table presents results from OLS and PROBIT regressions for the difference-in-difference estimation for the RMs’ regime switch. 
The unit of observation is the relationship manager (RM). Environmental changes that may have taken place in the period under 
consideration are taken care of through the use of a control group. The control group is a Business Unit which did not change its 
hierarchical structure, the GRB Unit. Personal Controls include Gender, Age and Experience in the bank. Otherwise noted Bank RM 
Controls include Number of Accounts and Size of Unit.  Pre-existing differences for RMs Switching Regimes is a dummy that assigns 
the value of 1 in both years to all individuals who switched regimes and tasks in 2001. This Treated variable captures the pre-existing 
differences associated with those individuals switching regimes. If this group constitutes a special set of officers, the dummy will capture 
such “Selection” effect. Therefore, the interaction term captures the causal effect of the change. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
Individual RM level are reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. 
 






Treatedi*Postt 0.6459* 0.6806* 0.6289* 0.7195** -3.2483** -2.3910**
(0.3467) (0.2831) (0.3457) (0.3463) (1.4156) (1.0688)
Postt -0.1054 -0.4154 0.3074 0.3295 -0.0329 -0.0071
(0.2386) (0.2853) (0.3049) (0.2790) (0.9518) (0.9257)
Single Hierarchy 1999 0.4654** 0.3253 0.2866 0.7137 -1.3672
(0.1899) (0.3078) (0.3924) (1.7652) (1.7601)
Personal  Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank RM Controls  Yes
1 Yes
2 Yes Yes
RM Fixed Effects Yes
R-Squared 0.35 0.75 0.32 0.38 0.53 0.33
Number Observations 32 32 32 32 32 32
Pre-existing differences  -0.1721 0.0205 -0.6743 -0.6540 2.4781 1.4199
for RMs- Treatedi (0.2102) (0.4281) (0.4169) (0.4243) (1.6204) (1.2671)
   




1. Regression includes as control variables Size of Unit and Number of Accounts. Size of Unit is negative, -0.2451, and statistically 
significant at 10%. 
2. Regression includes as controls variables Cross-Border Approval and Portfolio Type Classifications. Cross-Border Portfolio is 
negative and statistically significant at 10%. Results show that Portfolio Type Classifications I and II are positive and not statistically 
significant. The coefficient on Type II is higher than the one on Type I classification. Both classifications are expressed with respect to 
Type III Portfolio Classifications.    
 
Table VII 
Firm Level Analysis 
Selection, Comparability of Samples and Validity of Control Group 
Selected Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table analyses the comparability of samples and the validity of the control group at the firm level for selected descriptive statistics. Panel A              
-Selection and Comparability of Samples - compares the means of selected statistics across the treated samples of interest – firms that (in 1999 will 
be) and firms that (in 2001 were) assigned to Senior Bankers- in order to evaluate possible selection issues in terms of firms that were assigned to 
those individuals promoted to Senior Bankers, as well as selection of firms assigned to relationship managers working under different team sizes in 
the year 1999. Panel B tests for the validity of the Control Group. It compares the means of selected statistics for each treated sample of interest to 
the Control Group, in each year, to evaluate the adequacy of the latter. Control Group are the firms handled by any RM in the Global Relationship 
Banking Unit (GRB). A complete description of the definition of variables can be found in the Data Appendix. In Panel A:  *, ** and *** denote 
significant differences from the sample of firms assigned to RMs in each year at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively using a Mann-Whitney test for 
equality of distributions. In Panel B:   *, ** and *** denote significant differences from the control group sample of firms in each year at the 10, 5 
and 1% levels respectively using a Mann-Whitney test for equality of distributions. 
 
 
Selected Firm Level Variables SBs RMs SBs RMs Single RM RMs
Foreign Ownership 0.49 0.44 0.51 0.40 0.18* 0.44
Average Assets (in $ MM) 27.8 25.4 28.0 29.9 47.2** 25.4
Length of Relationship 0.58 0.58 0.68 0.66 0.50 0.58
Maturity > 3 Years - Covenants 0.21 0.25 0.07** 0.14 0.13* 0.25
Investment Grade Rating Firm 0.60 0.58 0.51 0.40 0.55 0.58
>50% Clean Exposure 0.75 0.71 0.91 0.84 0.73 0.71
Current Ratio 0.39 0.45 0.45 0.52 0.38* 0.45
Debt-to-Equity 0.45 0.49 0.39** 0.67 0.50 0.49
 
Selected Firm Level Variables SBs RMs Control SBs RMs Control
Foreign Ownership 0.49*** 0.44*** 0.85 0.51*** 0.40*** 0.94
Average Assets (in $ MM) 27.8* 25.4* 19.1 28.0* 29.9* 19.4
Length of Relationship 0.58 0.58* 0.54 0.68* 0.66 0.58
Maturity > 3 Years - Covenants 0.21*** 0.25*** 0.05 0.07*** 0.14*** 0.00
Investment Grade Rating Firm 0.60 0.58 0.66 0.51 0.40** 0.65
>50% Clean Exposure 0.75 0.71 0.77 0.91 0.84* 0.95
Current Ratio 0.39** 0.45* 0.75 0.45 0.52 0.71
Debt-to-Equity 0.45 0.49 0.58 0.39 0.67 0.42
 
1999 2001
Panel B - Validity of Control - Tests of Equality of Samples
2001 1999
Panel A - Selection and Comparability of Samples










 Table VIII 
Firm Level Analysis 
Difference-in-Difference Estimation - Senior Bankers 
it i t i t i t i i it e ε θ β β β δ γ γ α + + + + + + + + = it x   Z ) Post * Z ( ) Post * Treated ( Post   Treated 3 2 1 0  
 
This table presents results from OLS regressions for the difference-in-difference estimation for the Senior Bankers Case where the unit of observation is the firm. 
Postt is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 after the hierarchical change in structure takes place. The variable Treatedi is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 in both years for firms that were assigned to a Senior Banker after the change. The Treated variable captures the pre-existing differences associated to 
those firms assigned to Senior Bankers. If this group is a special set of firms, this dummy tries to capture the “Firm Selection” effect. Therefore, the interaction 
term captures the direct effect of the change in hierarchical structure. All regressions include Treatedi and Postt as control variables not reported in the tables.  In 
Columns (3) and (5), probability weights are used in order to compensate for the incomplete panel.  Column (6) presents GLS estimations in order to take 
heteroskedasticity at the firm level into account. Variables that denote Pre-existing differences are divided in soft and hard information categories and denoted by 
Zi. Such variables capture both qualitative and quantitative pre-existing differences in various fields for each firm. Management Risk, Industry Risk, Competitive 
Position Risk and Risk Management Policies represent averages of a set of specific questions that evaluate each field. A value of 1 is assigned to the particular 
field if the firm is in the top 50% distribution on that category in the year prior to the change. Sales-to-Assets, Debt-to-Equity and EBITDA-to-Sales also take a 
value of 1 if the firm is in the top 50% of the distribution in the year prior to the change. (Zi*Postt) controls for these time varying changes due to initial pre-
existing differences in the underlying characteristic of interest Zi. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parenthesis except for Columns 
(1) and (6). Column (1) reports robust standard errors and in (6) GLS grouped standard errors are reported. Evidence of heteroscedasticity from a Lagrange 
Multiplier Test was found at 1% level when using as controls those on (4) and (5). *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. 
 










Treatedi*Postt 0.3972** 0.3534* 0.5868* 0.3621* 0.5703* 0.6244*** 0.3279* 0.4163**
(0.2056) (0.2156) (0.3582) (0.2195) (0.3441) (0.1901) (0.1944) (0.2081)
Maturity > 3 years - Covenants 0.3765* 0.4984** 0.2783**
(0.2227) (0.2465) (0.1292)
Investment Grade Rating Firm -0.2508* -0.3152* -0.3322***
(0.1497) (0.1817) (0.0928)  
>50% Clean Exposure -0.1813 -0.0091 -0.0221
(0.2267) (0.2185) (0.1060)  
Length of Relationship 0.2505* 0.2883* 0.1593*
(0.1443) (0.1714) (0.0938)  





Competitive Position Riski*Postt -0.3771
(0.2711)
Risk Management Policiesi*Postt -0.2789
(0.2707)
Access to Capital Markets -0.3511**
(0.1563)









Industry Fixed Effects   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SB Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R -Squared /Chi-Squared 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.33 47.92 0.3 0.17
Number Observations 368 368 368 273 273 273 273 273
Control Group For all Columns RMs not promoted to Senior Bankers and those in GRB Unit.   
 
Notes: Column (4), (5) and (6) also include Years in Industry and Ownership not reported on the table. Although statistically significant, the effect on perceived 
effort of such variables is close to 0. Table IX 
Firm Level Data Analysis  
Difference-in-Difference Estimation – Differential Effort Impact RMs’ Regime Switch  
it t i t i t i i it e ε θ β β δ γ γ α + + + + + + + = it x   ) Post * Z ( ) Post * Treated ( Post   Treated 2 1 0  
 
This table presents results from OLS regressions for the difference-in-difference estimation for the RMs’ regime switch. The unit of observation is the firm. All regressions include Treatedi and Postt as 
control variables not reported in the table. Panel A reports results for the average impact of the change with no distinction between single or multiple hierarchies. Panel B reports the differential effort 
impact of the change by using two separate variables: (Single-Multiplei*Postt) and (Multiple-Multiplei*Postt). Single-Multiplei*Postt is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for those firms that 
were handled by RMs in a 1-1 relationship in 1999 and switched to 1-2 relationships in 2001, while Multiple-Multiplei*Postt takes the value of 1 for those firms handled by RMs in 1-2 relationships in 
both years. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parenthesis except in Columns (9), (10) and (11) where GLS grouped standard errors are reported. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. 













Treatedi*Postt 0.5057** 0.6721* 0.5317** 0.4904** 0.6922*** 0.7869**
(0.2361) (0.4052) (0.2386) (0.2554) (0.2805) (0.4316)
Single-Multiplei*Postt 0.2826 0.5832 0.3685 0.4131 0.2791
(0.3581) (0.5351) (0.3702) (0.4457) (0.5844)
Multiple-Multiplei*Postt 0.7077*** 0.6969* 0.7878*** 0.6913*** 0.9095**
(0.2408) (0.4159) (0.2498) (0.2528) (0.4649)
Single Relationship 1999 0.4729*** 0.5124*** 0.3242 0.4981*** 0.2869
(0.1866) (0.1893) (0.2209) (0.1949) (0.2205)
Maturity > 3 years - Covenants 0.3422** 0.3235* 0.3265* 0.2742*
(0.1792) (0.1946) (0.1497) (0.1769)
Investment Grade Rating Firm -0.2431* -0.1879 -0.2512* -0.1878
(0.1406) (0.2001) (0.1482) (0.1991)
>50% Clean Exposure -0.1235 -0.1612 -0.1222 -0.1961
(0.2446) (0.2419) (0.2371) (0.2334)
Length of Relationship 0.2574* 0.1721 0.2754* 0.1781
(0.1463) (0.2102) (0.1543) (0.2105)
RM Fixed Effects Yes       Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects     Yes Yes Yes
      
R-Squared/Adjusted R-Squared 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.04
Number Observations 323 323 323 323 232 232 323 323 323 232 232








Firm Level Analysis  
Monitoring and Heterogeneity Effects 
Comparison of Specific Characteristics across firms assigned to Senior Bankers 
 
This table presents a test of equality of samples to analyze if firms given to Senior Bankers after the change 
were sorted differently. It compares the means of selected statistics across firms assigned to Senior Bankers 
prior to the change and firms assigned to the whole sample of Relationship Managers prior to the change. Firm 
characteristics are represented by dummy variables. The underlying characteristic of  a firm is assigned a value 
of 1 if it belongs to the top half of the distribution of all firms in that aspect. Exceptions are Average Assets, 
Return-on- Assets, Return-on-Equity and the Cross-Selling Ratio. No significant pre-existing differences were 
found across firms that would be given to Senior Bankers in 2001 prior to the change and those that would not, 
using a Mann-Whitney test for equality of distributions. 
 
Selected Firm Level Variables SBs RMs
Average Assets (in $MM) 27.8 25.4
Competitive Position Risk Assesment 0.59 0.53
Management Risk Assesment 0.59 0.57
Industry Risk Assesment 0.59 0.55
Key Success Factors 0.21 0.20
Access to Capital Markets 0.42 0.36
Other Bank Relationships 0.42 0.36
Return-on-Assets (%) 0.03 0.03




Cross-Selling Ratio 0.42 0.41





 Table XI 
Firm Level Analysis 
Monitoring and Heterogeneity Effects - Are Differences in Firm Characteristics Driving the Results? 
  it i i i t i t i i t i t i i it Z Z Z Z e ε β β β β β δ γ γ α + + + + + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1 0 ) Treated * ( ) Post * ( ) Post * Treated * ( ) Post * Treated ( Post   Treated  
 
This table presents results from OLS regressions to test for alternative explanations for the increase in effort other than the hierarchical structure change, in terms of pre-existing differences in variables that 
affect monitoring activities. Stories as Frequency of Interactions [Column (1)], Bargaining Strength [Columns (2) and (3)], Concavity [Columns (4) and (5)] and Internal Bank Criteria monitoring activities 
[Columns (6) to (9)] are tested. All regressions include Business Unit/Industry Fixed Effects, RM Fixed Effects and the underlying characteristic of interest Zi, and interaction terms of the underlying 
characteristic of interest, Zi  with Postt and Zi with Treatedi. The former interaction term captures the effect of Zi on monitoring after the change in hierarchical structure, while the later captures possible pre-
existing differences in the set of firms given to SBs.  The interaction terms of interest –reported in the tables- are (Zi* Treatedi* Postt) and (Treatedi* Postt). The former captures the differential effect of the 
underlying characteristic of the firm after the change for the firms given to SBs while the later captures the direct effect of the organizational change. The underlying characteristics Zi , for columns (1) to (5) is 
assigned a value of 1 if a firm was in the top half of the distribution for the characteristic under consideration in the year prior to the change. In Columns (6) to (9), the characteristic Zi is a dummy variable that 
assigns a value of 1 if the answer to the underlying question of the Internal Bank Criteria is “yes” in 1999. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parenthesis, with   *, **, *** to denote 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. 
Frequency of 
Interactions












Treatedi*Postt 0.5789* 0.5252* 0.3459 0.8038** 0.5815 0.2233 0.3856* 0.4498* 0.4584* 0.4033*
(0.3149) (0.2899) (0.2182) (0.2978) (0.4433) (0.2862) (0.2268) (0.2679) (0.2499) (0.2444)
Sales-to-assetsi*Treatedi*Postt 0.2847
(0.4484)








Investment Grade Ratingi*Treatedi*Postt -0.2369
(0.4571)
Significant Increase Facilityi*Treatedi*Postt 0.5716** 0.5816*
(0.2649) (0.3071)
Downgrade Risk Ratingi*Treatedi*Postt 0.3621* 0.1911
(0.1913) (0.2802)
Collateral/Support Changei*Treatedi*Postt 1.2539*** 1.2250***
(0.4649) (0.4921)
Access to Capital Markets -0.3000** -0.3208** -0.3307* -0.3351** -0.2999** -0.2437* -0.3238** -0.3048* -0.2938* -0.2681*
(0.1563) (0.1486) (0.1804) (0.1467) (0.1449) (0.1447) (0.1561) (0.1575) (0.1538) (0.1624)
Adjusted R-Squared  0.12 0.16 0.11 0.20 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15
Number of Observations 273 273 273 273 273 273 273 264 264 264
Strength




For the Bargaining Strength, I also used as underlying characteristic of the firm Net Worth. Results, not reported, suggest that the size of the firm do not play a role in monitoring activities. For the Concavity 
story Return on Assets -ROAi- was also used as an underlying characteristic for the firm. Results, not reported in the table, are qualitative and significantly the same obtained for the ROEi . For the Concavity 
story I used EBITDA of year 1999 –as reported in the table- and also one-year projected EBITDA according to the financial analysis of year 1999. Results, not reported, do not differ significantly.  Table XII 
Cross-Selling Hypothesis  
Effects on Loan Products Pricing 
 
This table presents some results from Liberti [2002] on the cross-selling hypothesis for large business firms. Results suggest the existence of cross-selling on those 
products where the role of the relationship manager is most influential. The sample includes all firms from the Corporate Bank for a 3 year period from 1999 to 2001.  
Panel A shows OLS results on the effects of non-lending revenues on the pricing of lending products which are classified in: Core Lending (Working Capital Loans), 
Trade Finance and Asset Based Finance. Panel B shows PROBIT results for the disaggregated effect that each non-lending product has on the pricing of working capital 
loans and on the overall earnings-per-asset measure. All regressions include year fixed effects and firm fixed effects. In order to account for the incomplete panel of firms, 
each regression is probability weighted according to the number of times each firm appears in the sample. For Panel A the independent variables are defined as follows.               
NL Revenues/Bank Assets per Product is the ratio of total non-lending revenues over the total outstanding position that the bank has in the underlying lending product.    
NL Revenues/Total Bank Portfolio is the ratio of total non-lending revenues over the bank’s total asset outstanding position independent of the product. The dependent 
variables Pricing of each lending product -Core Lending (CL), Trade Finance and Asset-Based Finance- are constructed as the ratio of net lending revenues from funds of 
each product over the average assets used by each firm per product. In Panel B, EPA is the Earnings-per-Asset defined as the ratio of total lending revenues over total 
average assets used by the firm independently of the product. All variables are on yearly basis. In Panel B each non-lending product is a dummy variable that is assigned a 
value of 1 if the firm has positive revenues on that product. 
 
Panel A: Effects on the Pricing of Lending Products 
Dependent  (1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (5)
Variable Pricing CL Pricing CL Pricing CL Pricing Trade Pricing Trade Pricing ABF
Revenues Non-Lending Products -6.79E-08** 5.49E-09
(2.93E-08) (4.16E-09)
NL Revenues/Bank Assets per Product -11.8483** 0.5288 -2.0239
(6.2658) (0.4512) (3.1906)
NL Revenues/Total Bank Portfolio -25.5495**
(10.9494)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-Squared  0.76 0.76 0.76 0.67 0.67 0.59
Number Observations 1352 1352 1352 539 539 839
 
 
Panel B: Effects of Non-Lending Products 
Dependent  (1) (2)
Variable Pricing CL EPA
Trade Service -0.0180*** -0.0129***
(0.0054) (0.0051)
Asset and Security Trading 0.0345 0.0271
(0.3422) (0.0132)
Capital Markets - Underwritting -0.0353** -0.0208**
(0.0178) (0.0096)
Cash Management  -0.0043 -0.0082
(0.0124) (0.0106)




Foreign Exchange 0.0081 0.0123
(0.0079) (0.0080)
Funding and Gapping 0.0098 0.0094
(0.0063) (0.0058)
Investment Asset Management -0.0613** -0.0570**
(0.0276) (0.0268)
Security Services - ADRs -0.0459*** -0.0362***
(0.0096) (0.0086)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Adjusted R-Squared  0.8 0.76
Number Observations 1352 1352
 Table XIII 
Firm Level Analysis 
Role of Qualitative Information in Pricing Decisions – A test for Stein (2002) 
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This table presents results from OLS regressions to test for the role of soft relative to hard information in pricing decisions at the firm level. A test for Stein (2002) is performed in order to understand the role that full and 
partial delegation of authority has in the transmission of and reliance on soft information. The dependent variable is the ratio of (Annual Net Revenues from Funds + Fees/ Average Assets) where the assets used correspond to 
working capital loans (Core Lending Business) as opposed to other portfolio products (Asset Based Finance and Trade Finance). Using results from Liberti (2002) on the Cross-selling Hypothesis, the only product where 
relationship managers can have an influence on the pricing/spread are the working capital loans. This is the reason why I present only the results on the pricing of core lending products. Results are both qualitative and 
quantitative similar if I use as dependent variable (Annual Net Revenues from Funds/ Average Assets) without fees and commissions for committed credit facilities instead of the one reported. Panel A shows the results for 
the full delegation case of the Senior Bankers where reliance on soft is higher relative to hard information as compared to the case where transmission of information must take place. Panel B shows the RMs Hierarchical 
Regime Switch where transmission of soft information to the direct report is much difficult, thus hard information has a higher impact on pricing than soft.  Regressions in Panel A include Business Unit/Industry  Fixed 
Effects, Length of Relationship, the underlying characteristic of interest Zi, and interaction terms of the underlying characteristic of interest, Zi  with Postt and Zi with Treatedi. The former interaction term captures the effect of 
Zi on monitoring after the change in hierarchical structure, while the later captures possible pre-existing differences in the set of firms given to each treated group. Regressions in Panel B include the same control variables as 
in Panel A but no fixed effects. The interaction terms of interest (reported in the tables) are (Zi* Treatedi* Postt) and (Treatedi* Postt). The former captures the differential effect of the underlying characteristic of the firm after 
the change for the firms given to the respective treated group while the later captures the direct effect of the hierarchical change. Management Risk, Industry Risk and Competitive Position Risk Assessments represent 
averages of a set of specific questions that evaluate each field. A value of 1 is assigned to the particular field if the firm is in the top 50% of the distribution on that category in the year prior to the change. EBITDA-to-Sales 
and ROE also take a value of 1 if the firm is in the top 50% of the distribution in the year prior to the change. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parenthesis *, **, *** to denote significance at the 
10, 5 and 1% level respectively. 
 
Dependent  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Variable Pricing CLSB Pricing CLSB Pricing CLSB Pricing CLSB Pricing CLSB Pricing CLSB Pricing CLSB Pricing CLSB Pricing CLSB Pricing CLSB Pricing CLRM Pricing CLRM
Treatedi*Postt 0.0147 0.0195 0.0236* 0.0371** 0.0191 0.0132 0.0238 0.0165 0.0301 0.0218 0.0302 0.0258
(0.0140) (0.0143) (0.0141) (0.0197) (0.0166) (0.0165) (0.0166) (0.0157) (0.0184) (0.0188) (0.0342) (0.0316)
 
Managementi*Treatedi*Postt -0.0859** -0.0621** -0.0766* -0.0801** -0.0702* -0.0840* -0.0449 -0.0403
(0.0388) (0.0255) (0.0430) (0.0371) (0.0402) (0.0436) (0.0674) (0.0571)
Industryi*Treatedi*Postt -0.0444* -0.0199  
(0.0253) (0.0229)   
Competitive Positioni*Treatedi*Postt -0.0779** -0.0593*  
(0.0331) (0.0354)
EBITDA-to-salesi*Treatedi*Postt -0.0256* -0.0122 -0.0162 -0.9199*
 (0.0141) (0.0233) (0.0233) (0.0549)
ROEi*Treatedi*Postt -0.0269 -0.0152 -0.0219  -0.0819*
(0.0214) (0.0202) (0.2000) (0.0475)
Investment Gradei*Treatedi*Postt -0.0117
(0.0226)
Access to Capital Markets -0.0278** -0.0292** -0.0297** -0.0271* -0.0305*** -0.0368** -0.0283** -0.0322** -0.0341*** -0.0264** -0.0475* -0.0477**
(0.0135) (0.0253) (0.0119) (0.0144) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0135) (0.0130) (0.0141) (0.0131) (0.0253) (0.0207)
 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.17 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.22 0.28 0.23 0.31 0.34 0.19 0.19 0.25
Number Observations 273 273 273 273 273 273 273 273 273 273 232 232




 I used EBITDA of year 1999 –as reported in the table- and also one-year projected EBITDA according to the financial analysis of year 1999. Results, not reported, do not differ significantly.   Table XIV 
Firm Level Analysis 
Real Impact of the Change – The Effect on Cross-Selling and on Profitability of Bank’s Financials 
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This table presents results from OLS regressions to analyze the impact that delegation of authority has on the real side of the bank. By using the same difference-in-difference 
procedure, I test for the effect that both full and partial delegation have on the cross-selling ratio, a profitability index, earnings-per-asset and the number of non-lending 
products. All regressions include Treatedi and Postt as control variables, not reported on the table.  Firm controls include Maturity of Outstanding Position >3 Years, Investment 
Grade Rating Firm, 50% of Outstanding as Clean Exposure and Length of Relationship. The unit of observation is the firm. The definition of dependent variables is as follows. 
Cross-sell (X-Sell) stands for the cross-selling ratio defined as the ratio of Non-Lending Revenues over Total Revenues.  The profitability index, TR/Assets,  is the ratio of Total 
Revenues over Average Assets defined on an annual basis. Earning-per-assets (EPA) is the ratio of All Lending Revenues over Average Assets. Lending Products are the 
Portfolio Assets Products classified in Core Lending, Trade Finance and Asset Based Finance products. The Number of Non-Lending Products is defined between 1 and 10. 
Non-Lending Products are classified in Trade Services, Asset and Security Trading, Capital Markets Underwritting, Cash Management Services (Local and International), 
Corporate Finance and Structured Finance, Derivatives, Foreign Exchange, Funding and Gapping, Investment Asset Management and Security Services ADRs. Robust standard 
errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parenthesis, with *, **, *** to denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. 
 
Dependent  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variable X-Sell log (X-Sell) log (X-Sell) EPA EPA  TR/Assets TR/Assets Number NLP
Treatedi*Postt 0.0958* 0.1625** 0.1361* 0.0271** 0.0269** 76.3392* 80.3735* 0.4653
(0.0509) (0.0775) (0.0777) (0.0121) (0.0113) (43.4429) (46.8325) (0.6004)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects     Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.08 0.12 0.31 0.34 0.34 0.22 0.43 0.27
Number Observations 368 368 273 368 273 368 273 368
Dependent  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variable X-Sell log (X-Sell) log (X-Sell) EPA EPA TR/Assets TR/Assets Number NLP
Treatedi*Postt 0.0542 0.1494** 0.1652*** 0.0068 0.0168** 55.1782 73.4902** 0.3103
(0.0753) (0.0612) (0.0429) (0.0141) (0.0073) (46.7893) (34.6554) (0.5214)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.01 0.05 0.11 0.03 0.14 0.03 0.12 0.27
Number Observations 323 323 232 323 232 323 232 323
Panel B - RMs Regime Switch
Panel A - Senior Bankers
 
 
 
 